\n\
\ \';
// var pos = getPosition(document.getElementById("RightPane"));
window.scrollTo(0,300);
var wait_display = "
";
document.getElementById("RightPane").innerHTML = wait_display;
var xhttp = new XMLHttpRequest();
xhttp.onreadystatechange = function() {
if (this.readyState == 4 && this.status == 200) {
/*
var res = evalJSFromHtml(ad);
*/
document.getElementById("RightPane").innerHTML = this.responseText;
/*
evalJSFromHtml(ad);
*/
}
};
var all = "../php/data_get.php?Topic=" + Topic + "&Type=button.list.summary";
xhttp.open("GET", all, true);
xhttp.send();
}
Casualties and losses
1,542 aircrew killed[11] 422 aircrew wounded[12] 1,744 aircraft destroyed[nb 8] 2,585 aircrew killed and missing, 925 captured, 735 wounded[14] 1,977 aircraft destroyed, 1,634 in combat and 343 non-combat[15]
Around 90,000 civilian casualties, 40,000 of them fatal.[16]
v t e
Campaigns of World War II
Europe
Poland
Phoney War
Winter War
Denmark
Denmark & Norway
France & Benelux
Britain
Balkans
Eastern Front
Finland
Western Front (1944–45)
Pacific War
China Pacific Ocean South-East Asia South West Pacific Japan Manchuria (1945)
Mediterranean and Middle East
North Africa Horn of Africa Mediterranean Sea Adriatic Malta Yugoslavia Iraq Syria–Lebanon Iran Italy Dodecanese Southern France
Other campaigns
Atlantic Arctic Strategic bombing America French West Africa Madagascar
Contemporaneous wars
Chinese Civil War USSR–Japan Border Wars French–Thai Ecuadorian–Peruvian War Ili Rebellion
v t e
Western Front of World War II
prelude
1939
Phoney War Saar The Heligoland Bight
1940
Luxembourg The Netherlands
The Hague Rotterdam Zeeland German bombing of Rotterdam
Belgium
Fort Eben-Emael Hannut Gembloux La Lys
France
Sedan
Montcornet
Arras
Lille
Boulogne
Calais
Abbeville
Paula
Dunkirk
Dunkirk
Dunkirk evacuation
Italian Invasion of France
Saumur
Britain
Kanalkampf
Adlertag
The Hardest Day
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Day
Sea Lion
1942–1943
Cerberus and Donnerkeil St Nazaire Raid Dieppe Raid
1944–1945
Overlord Dragoon Siegfried Line Market Garden
Arnhem
Hürtgen Forest Aachen Queen Scheldt Bulge
Nordwind Bodenplatte
Colmar Pocket Atlantic Pockets Invasion of Germany
strategic campaigns
The Blitz Defence of the Reich Raids on the Atlantic Wall Battle of Atlantic
The Battle of Britain (German: Luftschlacht um England, literally "The
Air Battle for England") was a military campaign of the Second World
War, in which the
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force (RAF) defended the United Kingdom
(UK) against large-scale attacks by the German Air Force (Luftwaffe).
It has been described as the first major military campaign fought
entirely by air forces.[17]
The British officially recognise the battle's duration as being from
10 July until 31 October 1940, which overlaps the period of
large-scale night attacks known as the Blitz, that lasted from 7
September 1940 to 11 May 1941.[18] German historians do not accept
this subdivision and regard the battle as a single campaign lasting
from July 1940 to June 1941, including the Blitz.[19]
The primary objective of the Nazi German forces was to compel Britain
to agree to a negotiated peace settlement. In July 1940 the air and
sea blockade began, with the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe mainly targeting
coastal-shipping convoys, ports and shipping centres, such as
Portsmouth. On 1 August, the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe was directed to achieve air
superiority over the RAF with the aim of incapacitating RAF Fighter
Command; 12 days later, it shifted the attacks to RAF airfields and
infrastructure.[20] As the battle progressed, the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe also
targeted factories involved in aircraft production and strategic
infrastructure. Eventually it employed terror bombing on areas of
political significance and on civilians.[nb 9]
The Germans had rapidly overwhelmed France and the Low Countries,
leaving Britain to face the threat of invasion by sea. The German high
command knew the difficulties of a seaborne attack[citation needed]
and its impracticality while the
Royal Navy
Royal Navy controlled the English
Channel and the North Sea.[22] On 16 July Hitler ordered the
preparation of
Operation Sea Lion
Operation Sea Lion as a potential amphibious and
airborne assault on Britain, to follow once the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe had air
superiority over the UK. In September
RAF Bomber Command
RAF Bomber Command night raids
disrupted the German preparation of converted barges, and the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe failure to overwhelm the RAF forced Hitler to postpone and
eventually cancel Operation Sea Lion.
Nazi Germany
Nazi Germany proved unable to sustain daylight raids, but their
continued night-bombing operations on Britain became known as the
Blitz.
Stephen Bungay regards the German failure to destroy Britain's
air defences to force an armistice (or even outright surrender) as the
first major defeat of
Nazi Germany
Nazi Germany in
World War II
World War II and a crucial
turning point in the conflict.[23]
The Battle of Britain takes its name from a speech by Winston
Churchill to the House of Commons on 18 June: "What General Weygand
has called The
Battle of France
Battle of France is over.
The Battle of Britain is
about to begin."[24]
Contents
1 Background
1.1 Developing air strategies 1.2 First stages of World War II 1.3 German aims and directives
1.3.1 Negotiated peace or neutrality 1.3.2 Blockade and siege 1.3.3 Invasion plans 1.3.4 Independent air attack
2 Opposing forces
2.1 Fighters 2.2 Bombers 2.3 Pilots 2.4 International participation
2.4.1 Allies 2.4.2 Axis
3
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe strategy
3.1 Regrouping of
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe in Luftflotten
3.2 Tactics
3.2.1
Fighter
Fighter formations
3.2.2 Higher-level dispositions
3.3 Intelligence 3.4 Navigational aids 3.5 Air-sea rescue
4 RAF strategy
4.1 The Dowding system 4.2 Intelligence 4.3 Air-sea rescue 4.4 Tactics
4.4.1
Fighter
Fighter formations
4.4.2 Squadron- and higher-level deployment
4.5
Bomber
Bomber and
Coastal Command
Coastal Command contributions
5 Phases of the battle
5.1 Small scale raids 5.2 Channel battles 5.3 Main assault
5.3.1 Assault on RAF: radar and airfields 5.3.2 Raids on British cities 5.3.3 Attacks on airfields from 24 August 5.3.4 Assessment of attempt to destroy the RAF
5.4 Day and night attacks on London: start of the Blitz 5.5 Night time Blitz, fighter-bomber day raids
5.5.1 Royal family
6 Attrition statistics
7 Propaganda
8 Aftermath
9
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Day
10 Memorials and museums
11 In popular culture
11.1 Media adaptations 11.2 In books 11.3 Miscellaneous
12 See also 13 Notes 14 References 15 Bibliography
15.1 General 15.2 Autobiographies and biographies 15.3 Aircraft 15.4 Additional references
Background[edit]
Strategic bombing during World War I
Strategic bombing during World War I introduced air attacks intended
to panic civilian targets and led in 1918 to the amalgamation of
British army and navy air services into the Royal Air Force.[25] Its
first Chief of the Air Staff
Hugh Trenchard
Hugh Trenchard was among the military
strategists in the 1920s like
Giulio Douhet
Giulio Douhet who saw air warfare as a
new way to overcome the stalemate of trench warfare. Interception was
nearly impossible with fighter planes no faster than bombers. Their
view (expressed vividly in 1932) was that the bomber will always get
through, and the only defence was a deterrent bomber force capable of
matching retaliation. Predictions were made that a bomber offensive
would quickly cause thousands of deaths and civilian hysteria leading
to capitulation, but widespread pacifism contributed to a reluctance
to provide resources.[26]
Developing air strategies[edit]
Germany was forbidden to have a military air force by the 1919 Treaty
of Versailles, but developed air crew training in civilian and sport
flying. Following a 1923 memorandum, the
Deutsche Luft Hansa
Deutsche Luft Hansa airline
developed designs which were claimed to be for passengers and freight,
but which could in fact be readily adapted into bombers, including the
Junkers Ju 52. In 1926 the secret
Lipetsk fighter-pilot school
Lipetsk fighter-pilot school began
operating.[27]
Erhard Milch
Erhard Milch organised rapid expansion, and following
the 1933
Nazi seizure of power
Nazi seizure of power his subordinate Robert Knauss
formulated a deterrence theory incorporating Douhet's ideas and
Tirpitz's "risk theory", which proposed a fleet of heavy bombers to
deter a preventive attack by France and
Poland
Poland before Germany could
fully rearm.[28] A winter 1933–34 war game indicated a need for
fighters and anti-aircraft protection as well as bombers. On 1 March
1935 the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe was formally announced, with Walther Wever as Chief
of Staff. The 1935
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe doctrine for "Conduct of the Air War"
(Die Luftkriegführung) set air power within the overall military
strategy, with critical tasks of attaining (local and temporary) air
superiority and providing battlefield support for army and naval
forces.
Strategic bombing
Strategic bombing of industries and transport could be
decisive longer term options, dependent on opportunity or preparations
by the army and navy, to overcome a stalemate or used when only
destruction of the enemy's economy would be conclusive.[29][30] The
list excluded bombing civilians to destroy homes or undermine morale,
as that was considered a waste of strategic effort, but the doctrine
allowed revenge attacks if German civilians were bombed. A revised
edition was issued in 1940, and the continuing central principle of
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe doctrine was that destruction of enemy armed forces was of
primary importance.[31]
The RAF responded to
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe developments with its 1934 Expansion
Plan A rearmament scheme, and in 1936 it was restructured into Bomber
Command, Coastal Command, Training Command and
Fighter
Fighter Command. The
latter was under Hugh Dowding, who opposed the doctrine that bombers
were unstoppable: the invention of radar at that time could allow
early detection, and prototype monoplane fighters were significantly
faster. Priorities were disputed, but in December 1937 the Minister in
charge of defence coordination Sir Thomas Inskip decided in Dowding's
favour, that "The role of our air force is not an early knock-out
blow" but rather was "to prevent the Germans from knocking us out" and
fighter squadrons were just as necessary as bomber squadrons.[32][33]
In the Spanish Civil War, the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe in the
Condor Legion
Condor Legion tried out
air fighting tactics and their new aeroplanes. Wolfram von Richthofen
became an exponent of air power providing ground support to other
services.[34] The difficulty of accurately hitting targets prompted
Ernst Udet
Ernst Udet to require that all new bombers had to be dive bombers, and
led to the development of the Knickebein system for night time
navigation. Priority was given to producing large numbers of smaller
aeroplanes, and plans for a long range four engined strategic bomber
were delayed.[25][35]
First stages of World War II[edit]
British
Prime Minister
Prime Minister Winston Churchill
The early stages of
World War II
World War II saw successful German invasions on
the continent aided decisively by the air power of the Luftwaffe,
which was able to establish tactical air superiority with great
efficiency. The speed with which German forces defeated most of the
defending armies in
Norway
Norway in early 1940 created a significant
political crisis in Britain. In early May 1940, the
Norway
Norway Debate
questioned the fitness for office of the British Prime Minister
Neville Chamberlain. On 10 May, the same day
Winston Churchill
Winston Churchill became
British Prime Minister, the Germans initiated the Battle of France
with an aggressive invasion of French territory. RAF
Fighter
Fighter Command
was desperately short of trained pilots and aircraft, but despite the
objections of its commander
Hugh Dowding
Hugh Dowding that the diversion of his
forces would leave home defences under-strength, Churchill sent
fighter squadrons, the Air Component of the British Expeditionary
Force, to support operations in France,[36] where the RAF suffered
heavy losses.[37]
After the evacuation of British and French soldiers from
Dunkirk
Dunkirk and
the French surrender on 22 June 1940, Hitler mainly focused his
energies on the possibility of invading the Soviet Union[38] in the
belief that the British, defeated on the continent and without
European allies, would quickly come to terms.[39] The Germans were so
convinced of an imminent armistice that they began constructing street
decorations for the homecoming parades of victorious troops.[40]
Although the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, and certain
elements of the British public favoured a negotiated peace with an
ascendant Germany, Churchill and a majority of his Cabinet refused to
consider an armistice.[41] Instead, Churchill used his skilful
rhetoric to harden public opinion against capitulation and to prepare
the British for a long war.
The Battle of Britain has the unusual distinction that it gained its
name before being fought. The name is derived from the This was their
finest hour speech delivered by
Winston Churchill
Winston Churchill in the House of
Commons on 18 June, more than three weeks prior to the generally
accepted date for the start of the battle:
... What General Weygand has called The
Battle of France
Battle of France is over. The
battle of Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle depends the
survival of Christian civilisation. Upon it depends our own British
life and the long continuity of our institutions and our Empire. The
whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us.
Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this island or lose the
war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be free and the life of
the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands. But if we fail,
then the whole world, including the United States, including all that
we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new Dark
Age made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of
a perverted science. Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties,
and so bear ourselves that, if the
British Empire
British Empire and its Commonwealth
last for a thousand years, men will still say, "This was their finest
hour".[24][42][43]
— Winston Churchill
German aims and directives[edit]
German Chancellor Adolf Hitler
From the outset of his rise to power, Hitler expressed admiration for
Britain, and throughout the Battle period he sought neutrality or a
peace treaty with Britain.[44] In a secret conference on 23 May 1939,
Hitler set out his rather contradictory strategy that an attack on
Poland
Poland was essential and "will only be successful if the Western
Powers keep out of it. If this is impossible, then it will be better
to attack in the West and to settle
Poland
Poland at the same time" with a
surprise attack. "If Holland and
Belgium
Belgium are successfully occupied and
held, and if France is also defeated, the fundamental conditions for a
successful war against
England
England will have been secured.
England
England can
then be blockaded from Western France at close quarters by the Air
Force, while the Navy with its submarines extend the range of the
blockade."[45][46]
When war commenced, Hitler and the OKW (
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht or
"High Command of the Armed Forces") issued a series of Directives
ordering planning and stating strategic objectives. "Directive No. 1
for the Conduct of the War" dated 31 August 1939 instructed the
invasion of
Poland
Poland on 1 September as planned. Potentially, Luftwaffe
"operations against England" were to "dislocate English imports, the
armaments industry, and the transport of troops to France. Any
favourable opportunity of an effective attack on concentrated units of
the English Navy, particularly on battleships or aircraft carriers,
will be exploited. The decision regarding attacks on
London
London is
reserved to me. Attacks on the English homeland are to be prepared,
bearing in mind that inconclusive results with insufficient forces are
to be avoided in all circumstances."[47][48] Both France and the UK
declared war on Germany; on 9 October Hitler's "Directive No. 6"
planned the offensive to defeat these allies and "win as much
territory as possible in Holland, Belgium, and northern France to
serve as a base for the successful prosecution of the air and sea war
against England".[49] On 29 November OKW "Directive No. 9 –
Instructions For Warfare Against The Economy Of The Enemy" stated that
once this coastline had been secured, the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe together with the
Kriegsmarine
Kriegsmarine (German Navy) was to blockade UK ports with sea mines,
attack shipping and warships, and make air attacks on shore
installations and industrial production. This directive remained in
force in the first phase of the Battle of Britain.[50][51] It was
reinforced on 24 May during the
Battle of France
Battle of France by "Directive No. 13"
which authorised the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe "to attack the English homeland in the
fullest manner, as soon as sufficient forces are available. This
attack will be opened by an annihilating reprisal for English attacks
on the
Ruhr
Ruhr Basin."[52]
By the end of June 1940, Germany had defeated Britain's allies on the
continent, and on 30 June the OKW Chief of Staff
Alfred Jodl
Alfred Jodl issued
his review of options to increase pressure on Britain to agree to a
negotiated peace. The first priority was to eliminate the RAF and gain
air supremacy. Intensified air attacks against shipping and the
economy could affect food supplies and civilian morale in the long
term. Reprisal attacks of terror bombing had the potential to cause
quicker capitulation, but the effect on morale was uncertain. Once the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe had control of the air, and the UK economy had been
weakened, an invasion would be a last resort or a final strike
("Todesstoss") after
England
England had already been conquered, but could
have a quick result.[clarification needed] On the same day, the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe Commander-in-Chief
Hermann Göring
Hermann Göring issued his operational
directive; to destroy the RAF, thus protecting German industry, and
also to block overseas supplies to Britain.[53][54] The German Supreme
Command argued over the practicality of these options.
In "Directive No. 16 – On preparations for a landing operation
against England" on 16 July,[55] Hitler required readiness by
mid-August for the possibility of an invasion he called Operation Sea
Lion, unless the British agreed to negotiations. The Luftwaffe
reported that it would be ready to launch its major attack early in
August. The
Kriegsmarine
Kriegsmarine Commander-in-Chief, Grand Admiral Erich
Raeder, continued to highlight the impracticality of these plans, and
said sea invasion could not take place before the Spring of 1941.
Hitler now argued that Britain was holding out in hope of assistance
from Russia, and the
Soviet Union
Soviet Union was to be invaded by mid 1941.[56]
Göring met his air fleet commanders, and on 24 July issued "Tasks and
Goals" of firstly gaining air supremacy, secondly protecting invasion
forces and attacking the Royal Navy's ships. Thirdly, they were to
blockade imports, bombing harbours and stores of supplies.[57]
Hitler's "Directive No. 17 – For the conduct of air and sea warfare
against England" issued on 1 August attempted to keep all the options
open. The Luftwaffe's
Adlertag
Adlertag campaign was to start around 5 August,
subject to weather, with the aim of gaining air superiority over
southern
England
England as a necessary precondition of invasion, to give
credibility to the threat and give Hitler the option of ordering the
invasion. The intention was to incapacitate the RAF so much that the
UK would feel open to air attack, and would begin peace negotiations.
It was also to isolate the UK and damage war production, beginning an
effective blockade.[58] Following severe
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe losses, Hitler
agreed at a 14 September OKW conference that the air campaign was to
intensify regardless of invasion plans. On 16 September, Göring gave
the order for this change in strategy,[59] to the first independent
strategic bombing campaign.[60]
Negotiated peace or neutrality[edit]
Adolf Hitler's
Mein Kampf
Mein Kampf of 1923 mostly set out his hatreds: he only
admired ordinary German
World War I
World War I soldiers and Britain, which he saw
as an ally against communism. In 1935
Hermann Göring
Hermann Göring welcomed news
that Britain as a potential ally was rearming. In 1936 he promised
assistance to defend the British Empire, asking only a free hand in
Eastern Europe, and repeated this to Lord Halifax in 1937. That year,
von Ribbentrop met Churchill with a similar proposal; when rebuffed,
he told Churchill that interference with German domination would mean
war. To Hitler's great annoyance, all his diplomacy failed to stop
Britain from declaring war when he invaded Poland. During the fall of
France, he repeatedly discussed peace efforts with his generals.[44]
When Churchill came to power, there was still wide support for
Halifax, who as Foreign Secretary openly argued for peace negotiations
in the tradition of British diplomacy, to secure British independence
without war. On 20 May, Halifax secretly requested a Swedish
businessman to make contact with Göring to open negotiations. Shortly
afterwards, in the May 1940 War Cabinet Crisis, Halifax argued for
negotiations involving the Italians, but this was rejected by
Churchill with majority support. An approach made through the Swedish
ambassador on 22 June was reported to Hitler, making peace
negotiations seem feasible. Throughout July, as the battle started,
the Germans made wider attempts to find a diplomatic solution.[61] On
2 July, the day the armed forces were asked to start preliminary
planning for an invasion, Hitler got von Ribbentrop to draft a speech
offering peace negotiations. On 19 July Hitler made this speech to the
German Parliament in Berlin, appealing "to reason and common sense",
and said he could "see no reason why this war should go on".[62] His
sombre conclusion was received in silence, but he did not suggest
negotiations and this was effectively an ultimatum which was rejected
by the British government.[63][64] Halifax kept trying to arrange
peace until he was sent to Washington in December as ambassador,[65]
and in January 1941 Hitler expressed continued interest in negotiating
peace with Britain.[66]
Blockade and siege[edit]
A May 1939 planning exercise by
Luftflotte 3
Luftflotte 3 found that the Luftwaffe
lacked the means to do much damage to Britain's war economy beyond
laying naval mines.[67] The Head of
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe intelligence Joseph
"Beppo" Schmid presented a report on 22 November 1939, stating that
"Of all Germany's possible enemies, Britain is the most
dangerous."[68] This "Proposal for the Conduct of Air Warfare" argued
for a counter to the British blockade and said "Key is to paralyse the
British trade".[50] Instead of the Wehrmacht attacking the French, the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe with naval assistance was to block imports to Britain and
attack seaports. "Should the enemy resort to terror measures—for
example, to attack our towns in western Germany" they could retaliate
by bombing industrial centres and London. Parts of this appeared on 29
November in "Directive No. 9" as future actions once the coast had
been conquered.[51] On 24 May 1940 "Directive No. 13" authorised
attacks on the blockade targets, as well as retaliation for RAF
bombing of industrial targets in the Ruhr.[52]
After the defeat of France the High Command (OKW) felt they had won
the war, and some more pressure would persuade Britain. On 30 June the
OKW Chief of Staff
Alfred Jodl
Alfred Jodl issued his paper setting out options:
the first was to increase attacks on shipping, economic targets and
the RAF: air attacks and food shortages were expected to break morale
and lead to capitulation. Destruction of the RAF was the first
priority, and invasion would be a last resort. Hermann Göring's
operational directive issued the same day ordered destruction of the
RAF to clear the way for attacks cutting off seaborne supplies to
Britain. It made no mention of invasion.[54][69]
Invasion plans[edit]
Main article: Operation Sea Lion
In November 1939, the OKW reviewed the potential for an air- and
seaborne invasion of Britain: the
Kriegsmarine
Kriegsmarine (German Navy) was faced
with the threat the Royal Navy's larger
Home Fleet
Home Fleet posed to a crossing
of the English Channel, and together with the German Army viewed
control of airspace as a necessary precondition. The
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe said
invasion could only be "the final act in an already victorious
war."[70]
Hitler first discussed the idea at a 21 May 1940 meeting with Grand
Admiral Erich Raeder, who stressed the difficulties and his own
preference for a blockade. OKW Chief of Staff Alfred Jodl's 30 June
report described invasion as a last resort once the British economy
had been damaged and the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe had full air superiority. On 2
July, OKW requested preliminary plans.[20][64] In Britain, Churchill
described "the great invasion scare" as "serving a very useful
purpose" by "keeping every man and woman tuned to a high pitch of
readiness".[71] On 10 July, he advised the War Cabinet that invasion
could be ignored, as it "would be a most hazardous and suicidal
operation".[72]
On 11 July, Hitler agreed with Raeder that invasion would be a last
resort, and the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe advised that gaining air superiority would
take 14 to 28 days. Hitler met his army chiefs, von Brauchitsch and
Halder, who presented detailed plans on the assumption that the navy
would provide safe transport.[73] Hitler showed no interest in the
details, but on 16 July he issued Directive No. 16 ordering
preparations for Operation Sea Lion.[74]
The navy insisted on a narrow beachhead and an extended period for
landing troops; the army rejected these plans: the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe could
begin an air attack in August. Hitler held a meeting of his army and
navy chiefs on 31 July. The navy said 22 September was the earliest
possible date, and proposed postponement until the spring, but Hitler
preferred September. He then told von Brauchitsch and Halder that he
would decide on the landing operation eight to fourteen days after the
air attack began. On 1 August he issued Directive No. 17 for
intensified air and sea warfare, to begin with
Adlertag
Adlertag on or after 5
August subject to weather, keeping options open for negotiated peace
or blockade and siege.[75]
Independent air attack[edit]
Under the continuing influence of the 1935 "Conduct of the Air War"
doctrine, the main focus of the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe command (including Göring)
was in concentrating attacks to destroy enemy armed forces on the
battlefield, and "blitzkrieg" close air support of the army succeeded
brilliantly. They reserved strategic bombing for a stalemate situation
or revenge attacks, but doubted if this could be decisive on its own
and regarded bombing civilians to destroy homes or undermine morale as
a waste of strategic effort.[76][77]
The defeat of France in June 1940 introduced the prospect for the
first time of independent air action against Britain. A July
Fliegercorps I paper asserted that Germany was by definition an air
power: "Its chief weapon against
England
England is the Air Force, then the
Navy, followed by the landing forces and the Army." In 1940, the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe would undertake a "strategic offensive ... on its own and
independent of the other services", according to an April 1944 German
account of their military mission. Göring was convinced that
strategic bombing could win objectives which were beyond the army and
navy, and gain political advantages in the Third Reich for the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe and himself.[78] He expected air warfare to decisively force
Britain to negotiate, as all in the OKW hoped, and the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe took
little interest to planning to support an invasion.[79][54]
Opposing forces[edit]
Main article: Aircraft of the Battle of Britain
Further information:
RAF Fighter Command
RAF Fighter Command Order of Battle 1940 and
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe Order of Battle August 1940
Further information: List of officially accredited Battle of Britain
squadrons
The
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe faced a more capable opponent than any it had previously
met: a sizeable, highly coordinated, well-supplied, modern air force.
Fighters[edit]
The Luftwaffe's Messerschmitt
Bf 109E
Bf 109E and Bf 110C fought against the
RAF's workhorse Hurricane Mk I and the less numerous Spitfire Mk I;
Hurricanes outnumbered Spitfires in
RAF Fighter Command
RAF Fighter Command by about 2:1
when war broke out.[80] The
Bf 109E
Bf 109E had a better climb rate and was up
to 40 mph faster in level flight than the Rotol (constant speed
propeller) equipped Hurricane Mk I, depending on altitude.[81] The
speed and climb disparity with the original non-Rotol Hurricane was
even greater. By the end of spring 1940, all RAF Spitfire and
Hurricane fighter squadrons converted to 100 octane aviation fuel,[82]
which allowed their Merlin engines to generate significantly more
power and an approximately 30 mph increase in speed at low
altitudes[83][84] through the use of an Emergency Boost
Override.[85][86][87] In September 1940, the more powerful Mk IIa
series 1 Hurricanes started entering service in small numbers.[88]
This version was capable of a maximum speed of 342 mph
(550 km/h), some 20 mph more than the original (non-Rotol)
Mk I, though it was still 15 to 20 mph slower than a Bf 109
(depending on altitude).[89]
Hawker Hurricane
Hawker Hurricane R4118 fought in the Battle of Britain. Here it
arrives at the 2014 Royal International Air Tattoo, England.
X4382, a late production Spitfire Mk I of 602 Squadron flown by P/O Osgood Hanbury, Westhampnett, September 1940
The performance of the Spitfire over
Dunkirk
Dunkirk came as a surprise to the
Jagdwaffe, although the German pilots retained a strong belief that
the 109 was the superior fighter.[90] The British fighters were
equipped with eight Browning .303 (7.7mm) machine guns, while most Bf
109Es had two 7.92mm machine guns supplemented by two 20mm cannons.[nb
10] The latter was much more effective than the .303; during the
Battle it was not unknown for damaged German bombers to limp home with
up to two hundred .303 hits.[91] At some altitudes, the Bf 109 could
outclimb the British fighter. It could also engage in vertical-plane
negative-g manoeuvres without the engine cutting out because its DB
601 engine used fuel injection; this allowed the 109 to dive away from
attackers more readily than the carburettor-equipped Merlin. On the
other hand, the
Bf 109E
Bf 109E had a much larger turning circle than its two
foes.[92] In general, though, as Alfred Price noted in The Spitfire
Story:
... the differences between the Spitfire and the Me 109 in performance and handling were only marginal, and in a combat they were almost always surmounted by tactical considerations of which side had seen the other first, which had the advantage of sun, altitude, numbers, pilot ability, tactical situation, tactical co-ordination, amount of fuel remaining, etc.[93]
Messerschmitt Bf 109E-4
The
Bf 109E
Bf 109E was also used as a Jabo (jagdbomber, fighter-bomber)—the
E-4/B and E-7 models could carry a 250 kg bomb underneath the
fuselage, the later model arriving during the battle. The Bf 109,
unlike the Stuka, could fight on equal terms with RAF fighters after
releasing its ordnance.[94][95]
At the start of the battle, the twin-engined Messerschmitt Bf 110C
long range Zerstörer ("Destroyer") was also expected to engage in
air-to-air combat while escorting the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe bomber fleet. Although
the 110 was faster than the Hurricane and almost as fast as the
Spitfire, its lack of manoeuvrability and acceleration meant that it
was a failure as a long-range escort fighter. On 13 and 15 August,
thirteen and thirty aircraft were lost, the equivalent of an entire
Gruppe, and the type's worst losses during the campaign.[96] This
trend continued with a further eight and fifteen lost on 16 and 17
August.[97] Göring ordered the Bf 110 units to operate "where the
range of the single-engined machines were not sufficient".[citation
needed]
The most successful role of the Bf 110 during the battle was as a
Schnellbomber (fast bomber). The Bf 110 usually used a shallow dive to
bomb the target and escape at high speed.[98][99] One unit,
Erprobungsgruppe 210 – initially formed as the service test unit
(Erprobungskommando) for the emerging successor to the 110, the Me 210
– proved that the Bf 110 could still be used to good effect in
attacking small or "pinpoint" targets.[98]
Four 264 Squadron Defiants (PS-V was shot down on 28 August 1940 over
Kent
Kent by Bf 109s.)
The RAF's
Boulton Paul Defiant
Boulton Paul Defiant had some initial success over Dunkirk
because of its resemblance to the Hurricane;
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe fighters
attacking from the rear were surprised by its unusual gun turret.[100]
However, during the Battle of Britain, this single-engined two-seater
proved hopelessly outclassed. For various reasons, the Defiant lacked
any form of forward-firing armament, and the heavy turret and second
crewman meant it could not outrun or outmanoeuvre either the Bf 109 or
Bf 110. By the end of August, after disastrous losses, the aircraft
was withdrawn from daylight service.[101][102]
Bombers[edit]
Heinkel He 111
Heinkel He 111 bombers during the Battle of Britain
The Luftwaffe's primary bombers were the Heinkel He 111, Dornier Do
17, and
Junkers Ju 88
Junkers Ju 88 for level bombing at medium to high altitudes,
and the
Junkers Ju 87
Junkers Ju 87 Stuka for dive bombing tactics. The He 111 was
used in greater numbers than the others during the conflict, and was
better known, partly due to its distinctive wing shape. Each level
bomber also had a few reconnaissance versions accompanying them that
were used during the battle.[103]
Although it had been successful in previous
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe engagements, the
Stuka suffered heavy losses in the Battle of Britain, particularly on
18 August, due to its slow speed and vulnerability to fighter
interception after dive bombing a target. As the losses went up along
with their limited payload and range, Stuka units were largely removed
from operations over
England
England and diverted to concentrate on shipping
instead until they were eventually re-deployed to the Eastern Front in
1941. However, for some raids, they were called back, such as on 13
September to attack Tangmere airfield.[104][105][106]
The remaining three bomber types differed in their capabilities; the
Heinkel 111 was the slowest; the Ju 88 was the fastest once its mainly
external bomb load was dropped; and the Do 17 had the smallest bomb
load.[103] All three bomber types suffered heavy losses from the
home-based British fighters, but the Ju 88 disproportionately so. The
German bombers required constant protection by the Luftwaffe's fighter
force. German escorts, however, were not sufficiently numerous. Bf
109Es were ordered to support more than 300–400 bombers on any given
day.[107] Later in the conflict, when night bombing became more
frequent, all three were used. However, due to its smaller bomb load,
the lighter Do 17 was used less than the He 111 and Ju 88 for this
purpose.
German propaganda photo purporting to show a Spitfire I flying very close to a Dornier 17Z[nb 11]
On the British side, three bomber types were mostly used on night
operations against targets such as factories, invasion ports and
railway centres; the Armstrong Whitworth Whitley, the Handley-Page
Hampden and the
Vickers Wellington
Vickers Wellington were classified as heavy bombers by
the RAF, although the Hampden was a medium bomber comparable to the He
111. The twin-engined
Bristol Blenheim
Bristol Blenheim and the obsolescent
single-engined
Fairey Battle
Fairey Battle were both light bombers; the Blenheim was
the most numerous of the aircraft equipping
RAF Bomber Command
RAF Bomber Command and was
used in attacks against shipping, ports, airfields and factories on
the continent by day and by night. The
Fairey Battle
Fairey Battle squadrons, which
had suffered heavy losses in daylight attacks during the Battle of
France, were brought up to strength with reserve aircraft and
continued to operate at night in attacks against the invasion ports,
until the Battle was withdrawn from UK front line service in October
1940.[108][110]
Pilots[edit]
Before the war, the RAF's processes for selecting potential candidates
were opened to men of all social classes through the creation in 1936
of the RAF Volunteer Reserve, which "... was designed to appeal,
to ... young men ... without any class
distinctions ..."[111] The older squadrons of the Royal Auxiliary
Air Force did retain some of their upper-class exclusiveness,[112] but
their numbers were soon swamped by the newcomers of the RAFVR; by 1
September 1939, 6,646 pilots had been trained through the RAFVR.[113]
A Spitfire pilot recounts how he shot down a Messerschmitt, Biggin Hill, September 1940
By summer 1940, there were about 9,000 pilots in the RAF to man about
5,000 aircraft, most of which were bombers.[citation needed] Fighter
Command was never short of pilots, but the problem of finding
sufficient numbers of fully trained fighter pilots became acute by
mid-August 1940.[114] With aircraft production running at 300 planes
each week, only 200 pilots were trained in the same period. In
addition, more pilots were allocated to squadrons than there were
aircraft, as this allowed squadrons to maintain operational strength
despite casualties and still provide for pilot leave.[115] Another
factor was that only about 30% of the 9,000 pilots were assigned to
operational squadrons; 20% of the pilots were involved in conducting
pilot training, and a further 20% were undergoing further instruction,
like those offered in
Canada
Canada and in
Southern Rhodesia
Southern Rhodesia to the
Commonwealth trainees, although already qualified. The rest were
assigned to staff positions, since RAF policy dictated that only
pilots could make many staff and operational command decisions, even
in engineering matters. At the height of fighting, and despite
Churchill's insistence, only 30 pilots were released to the front line
from administrative duties.[116][nb 12]
For these reasons, and the permanent loss of 435 pilots during the
Battle of France
Battle of France alone[37] along with many more wounded, and others
lost in Norway, the RAF had fewer experienced pilots at the start of
the initial defence of their home. It was the lack of trained pilots
in the fighting squadrons, rather than the lack of aircraft, that
became the greatest concern for Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding,
Commander of
Fighter
Fighter Command. Drawing from regular RAF forces, the
Auxiliary Air Force and the Volunteer Reserve, the British were able
to muster some 1,103 fighter pilots on 1 July. Replacement pilots,
with little flight training and often no gunnery training, suffered
high casualty rates, thus exacerbating the problem.[117]
The Luftwaffe, on the other hand, were able to muster a larger number
(1,450) of more experienced fighter pilots.[116] Drawing from a cadre
of
Spanish Civil War
Spanish Civil War veterans, these pilots already had comprehensive
courses in aerial gunnery and instructions in tactics suited for
fighter-versus-fighter combat.[118] Training manuals discouraged
heroism, stressing the importance of attacking only when the odds were
in the pilot's favour. Despite the high levels of experience, German
fighter formations did not provide a sufficient reserve of pilots to
allow for losses and leave,[115] and the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe was unable to
produce enough pilots to prevent a decline in operational strength as
the battle progressed.
International participation[edit]
[nb 13]
Allies[edit]
126 German aircraft or "Adolfs" were claimed by Polish pilots of 303 Squadron during the Battle of Britain
Main article: Non-British personnel in the RAF during the Battle of
Britain
The
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force roll of honour for the Battle of Britain
recognises 595 non-British pilots (out of 2,936) as flying at least
one authorised operational sortie with an eligible unit of the RAF or
Fleet Air Arm
Fleet Air Arm between 10 July and 31 October 1940.[10][119] These
included 145 Poles, 127 New Zealanders, 112 Canadians, 88
Czechoslovaks, 10 Irish, 32 Australians, 28 Belgians, 25 South
Africans, 13 French, 9 Americans, 3 Southern Rhodesians and one each
from
Jamaica
Jamaica and Mandatory Palestine.[120] "Altogether in the fighter
battles, the bombing raids, and the various patrols flown between 10
July and 31 October 1940 by the Royal Air Force, 1495 aircrew were
killed, of whom 449 were fighter pilots, 718 aircrew from Bomber
Command, and 280 from Coastal Command. Among those killed were 47
airmen from Canada, 24 from Australia, 17 from South Africa, 35 from
Poland, 20 from
Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia and six from Belgium. Forty-seven New
Zealanders lost their lives, including 15 fighter pilots, 24 bomber
and eight coastal aircrew. The names of these Allied and Commonwealth
airmen are inscribed in a memorial book which rests in the Battle of
Britain Chapel in Westminster Abbey. In the chapel is a stained glass
window which contains the badges of the fighter squadrons which
operated during the battle and the flags of the nations to which the
pilots and aircrew belonged."[121]
Axis[edit]
Main article: Corpo Aereo Italiano
An element of the Italian
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force (Regia Aeronautica) called
the Italian Air Corps (
Corpo Aereo Italiano
Corpo Aereo Italiano or CAI) first saw action
in late October 1940. It took part in the latter stages of the battle,
but achieved limited success. The unit was redeployed in early 1941.
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe strategy[edit]
Hermann Göring, the commander of the Luftwaffe
Hugo Sperrle, the commander of Luftflotte 3
The high command's indecision over which aim to pursue was reflected
in shifts in
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe strategy. Their Air War doctrine of
concentrated close air support of the army at the battlefront
succeeded in the blitzkrieg offensives against Poland,
Denmark
Denmark and
Norway, the
Low Countries
Low Countries and France, but incurred significant losses.
The
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe now had to establish or restore bases in the conquered
territories, and rebuild their strength. In June 1940 they began
regular armed reconnaissance flights and sporadic Störangriffe,
nuisance raids of one or a few bombers, both day and night. These gave
crews practice in navigation and avoiding air defences, and set off
air raid alarms which disturbed civilian morale. Similar nuisance
raids continued throughout the battle, into the winter months of 1940.
Scattered naval mine–laying sorties began at the outset, and
increased gradually over the battle period.[122][123]
Göring's operational directive of 30 June ordered destruction of the
RAF as a whole, including the aircraft industry, with the aims of
ending RAF bombing raids on Germany and facilitating attacks on ports
and storage in the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe blockade of Britain.[54] Attacks on
Channel shipping in the
Kanalkampf
Kanalkampf began on 4 July, and were
formalised on 11 July in an order by
Hans Jeschonnek
Hans Jeschonnek which added the
arms industry as a target.[124][125]
On 16 July Directive No. 16 ordered preparations for Operation Sea
Lion, and on the next day the luftwaffe was ordered to stand by in
full readiness. Göring met his air fleet commanders, and on 24 July
issued "Tasks and Goals" of gaining air supremacy, protecting the army
and navy if invasion went ahead, and attacking the Royal Navy's ships
as well as continuing the blockade. Once the RAF had been defeated,
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe bombers were to move forward beyond
London
London without the need
for fighter escort, destroying military and economic targets.[57]
At a meeting on 1 August the command reviewed plans produced by each
Fliegerkorps with differing proposals for targets including whether to
bomb airfields, but failed to focus priorities. Intelligence reports
gave Göring the impression that the RAF was almost defeated: the
intent was that raids would attract British fighters for the Luftwaffe
to shoot down.[126] On 6 August he finalised plans for this "Operation
Eagle Attack" with Kesselring, Sperle and Stumpff: destruction of RAF
Fighter
Fighter Command across the south of
England
England was to take four days,
with lightly escorted small bomber raids leaving the main fighter
force free to attack RAF fighters. Bombing of military and economic
targets was then to systematically extend up to the Midlands until
daylight attacks could proceed unhindered over the whole of
Britain.[127][128]
Bombing of
London
London was to be held back while these night time
"destroyer" attacks proceeded over other urban areas, then in
culmination of the campaign a major attack on the capital was intended
to cause a crisis when refugees fled
London
London just as the Operation Sea
Lion invasion was to begin.[129] With hopes fading for the possibility
of invasion, on 4 September Hitler authorised a main focus on day and
night attacks on tactical targets with
London
London as the main target, in
what the British called the Blitz. With increasing difficulty in
defending bombers in day raids, the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe shifted to a strategic
bombing campaign of night raids aiming to overcome British resistance
by damaging infrastructure and food stocks, though intentional terror
bombing of civilians was not sanctioned.[130]
Regrouping of
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe in Luftflotten[edit]
The
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe was forced to regroup after the
Battle of France
Battle of France into
three Luftflotten (Air Fleets) on Britain's southern and northern
flanks. Luftflotte 2, commanded by Generalfeldmarschall Albert
Kesselring, was responsible for the bombing of southeast
England
England and
the
London
London area. Luftflotte 3, under Generalfeldmarschall Hugo
Sperrle, targeted the West Country, Wales, the Midlands, and northwest
England. Luftflotte 5, led by
Generaloberst
Generaloberst
Hans-Jürgen Stumpff
Hans-Jürgen Stumpff from
his headquarters in Norway, targeted the north of
England
England and
Scotland. As the battle progressed, command responsibility shifted,
with
Luftflotte 3
Luftflotte 3 taking more responsibility for the night-time Blitz
attacks while the main daylight operations fell upon Luftflotte 2's
shoulders.
Initial
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe estimates were that it would take four days to
defeat the
RAF Fighter Command
RAF Fighter Command in southern England. This would be
followed by a four-week offensive during which the bombers and
long-range fighters would destroy all military installations
throughout the country and wreck the British aircraft industry. The
campaign was planned to begin with attacks on airfields near the
coast, gradually moving inland to attack the ring of sector airfields
defending London. Later reassessments gave the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe five weeks,
from 8 August to 15 September, to establish temporary air superiority
over England.[131] To achieve this goal,
Fighter
Fighter Command had to be
destroyed, either on the ground or in the air, yet the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe had
to be able to preserve its own strength to be able to support the
invasion; this meant that the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe had to maintain a high "kill
ratio" over the RAF fighters. The only alternative to the goal of air
superiority was a terror bombing campaign aimed at the civilian
population, but this was considered a last resort and it was (at this
stage of the battle) expressly forbidden by Hitler.[131]
The
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe kept broadly to this scheme, but its commanders had
differences of opinion on strategy.
Sperrle wanted to eradicate the
air defence infrastructure by bombing it. His counterpart, Kesselring,
championed attacking
London
London directly— either to bombard the British
government into submission, or to draw RAF fighters into a decisive
battle. Göring did nothing to resolve this disagreement between his
commanders, and only vague directives were set down during the initial
stages of the battle, with Göring seemingly unable to decide upon
which strategy to pursue.[132] He seemed at times obsessed with
maintaining his own power base in the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe and indulging his
outdated beliefs on air fighting, which would later lead to tactical
and strategic errors.[citation needed]
Tactics[edit]
Fighter
Fighter formations[edit]
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe formations employed a loose section of two (nicknamed the
Rotte (pack)), based on a leader (Rottenführer) followed at a
distance of about 200 metres[nb 14] by his wingman (nicknamed the
Rottenhund (pack dog) or Katschmarek[133]), who also flew slightly
higher and was trained always to stay with his leader. With more room
between them, both pilots could spend less time maintaining formation
and more time looking around and covering each other's blind spots.
Attacking aircraft could be sandwiched between the two 109s.[134] [nb
15] The Rotte allowed the Rottenführer to concentrate on getting
kills, but few wingmen had the chance,[136] leading to some resentment
in the lower ranks where it was felt that the high scores came at
their expense. Two sections were usually teamed up into a Schwarm,
where all the pilots could watch what was happening around them. Each
Schwarm
Schwarm in a Staffel flew at staggered heights and with about 200
metres of room between them, making the formation difficult to spot at
longer ranges and allowing for a great deal of flexibility.[118] By
using a tight "cross-over" turn, a
Schwarm
Schwarm could quickly change
direction.[134]
The Bf 110s adopted the same
Schwarm
Schwarm formation as the 109s, but were
seldom able to use this to the same advantage. The Bf 110's most
successful method of attack was the "bounce" from above. When
attacked, Zerstörergruppen increasingly resorted to forming large
"defensive circles", where each Bf 110 guarded the tail of the
aircraft ahead of it. Göring ordered that they be renamed "offensive
circles" in a vain bid to improve rapidly declining morale.[137] These
conspicuous formations were often successful in attracting RAF
fighters that were sometimes "bounced" by high-flying Bf 109s. This
led to the often repeated misconception that the Bf 110s were escorted
by Bf 109s.
Higher-level dispositions[edit]
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe tactics were influenced by their fighters. The Bf 110 proved
too vulnerable to the nimble single-engined RAF fighters. This meant
the bulk of fighter escort duties fell on the Bf 109.
Fighter
Fighter tactics
were then complicated by bomber crews who demanded closer protection.
After the hard-fought battles of 15 and 18 August, Göring met with
his unit leaders. During this conference, the need for the fighters to
meet up on time with the bombers was stressed. It was also decided
that one bomber Gruppe could only be properly protected by several
Gruppen of 109s. In addition, Göring stipulated that as many fighters
as possible were to be left free for Freie Jagd ("Free Hunts": a
free-roving fighter sweep preceded a raid to try to sweep defenders
out of the raid's path). The Ju 87 units, which had suffered heavy
casualties, were only to be used under favourable circumstances.[138]
In early September, due to increasing complaints from the bomber crews
about RAF fighters seemingly able to get through the escort screen,
Göring ordered an increase in close escort duties. This decision
shackled many of the Bf 109s to the bombers and, although they were
more successful at protecting the bomber forces, casualties amongst
the fighters mounted primarily because they were forced to fly and
manoeuvre at reduced speeds.[139]
The
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe consistently varied its tactics in its attempts to break
through the RAF defences. It launched many Freie Jagd to draw up RAF
fighters. RAF fighter controllers, however, were often able to detect
these and position squadrons to avoid them, keeping to Dowding's plan
to preserve fighter strength for the bomber formations. The Luftwaffe
also tried using small formations of bombers as bait, covering them
with large numbers of escorts. This was more successful, but escort
duty tied the fighters to the bombers' slow speed and made them more
vulnerable.
Pattern of condensation trails left by British and German aircraft after a dogfight.
By September, standard tactics for raids had become an amalgam of techniques. A Freie Jagd would precede the main attack formations. The bombers would fly in at altitudes between 16,000 feet (4,900 m) and 20,000 feet (6,100 m), closely escorted by fighters. Escorts were divided into two parts (usually Gruppen), some operating in close contact with the bombers, and others a few hundred yards away and a little above. If the formation was attacked from the starboard, the starboard section engaged the attackers, the top section moving to starboard and the port section to the top position. If the attack came from the port side the system was reversed. British fighters coming from the rear were engaged by the rear section and the two outside sections similarly moving to the rear. If the threat came from above, the top section went into action while the side sections gained height to be able to follow RAF fighters down as they broke away. If attacked, all sections flew in defensive circles. These tactics were skilfully evolved and carried out, and were difficult to counter.[140]
Adolf Galland, the successful leader of III./JG 26, became
Geschwaderkommodore of
JG 26
JG 26 on 22 August
Adolf Galland
Adolf Galland noted:
We had the impression that, whatever we did, we were bound to be
wrong.
Fighter
Fighter protection for bombers created many problems which had
to be solved in action.
Bomber
Bomber pilots preferred close screening in
which their formation was surrounded by pairs of fighters pursuing a
zigzag course. Obviously, the visible presence of the protective
fighters gave the bomber pilots a greater sense of security. However,
this was a faulty conclusion, because a fighter can only carry out
this purely defensive task by taking the initiative in the offensive.
He must never wait until attacked because he then loses the chance of
acting.
We fighter pilots certainly preferred the free chase during the
approach and over the target area. This gives the greatest relief and
the best protection for the bomber force.[141]
The biggest disadvantage faced by Bf 109 pilots was that without the
benefit of long-range drop tanks (which were introduced in limited
numbers in the late stages of the battle), usually of 300 litres
(66 imp gal; 79 US gal) capacity, the 109s had an
endurance of just over an hour and, for the 109E, a 600 km
(370 mi) range. Once over Britain, a 109 pilot had to keep an eye
on a red "low fuel" light on the instrument panel: once this was
illuminated, he was forced to turn back and head for France. With the
prospect of two long flights over water, and knowing their range was
substantially reduced when escorting bombers or during combat, the
Jagdflieger coined the term Kanalkrankheit or "Channel sickness".[142]
Intelligence[edit]
The
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe was ill-served by its lack of military intelligence
about the British defences.[143] The German intelligence services were
fractured and plagued by rivalries; their performance was
"amateurish".[144] By 1940, there were few German agents operating in
Great Britain and a handful of bungled attempts to insert spies into
the country were foiled.[145]
As a result of intercepted radio transmissions, the Germans began to
realise that the RAF fighters were being controlled from ground
facilities; in July and August 1939, for example, the airship Graf
Zeppelin, which was packed with equipment for listening in on RAF
radio and RDF transmissions, flew around the coasts of Britain.
Although the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe correctly interpreted these new ground control
procedures, they were incorrectly assessed as being rigid and
ineffectual. A British radar system was well known to the Luftwaffe
from intelligence gathered before the war, but the highly developed
"Dowding system" linked with fighter control had been a well-kept
secret.[146][147] Even when good information existed, such as a
November 1939 Abwehr assessment of
Fighter
Fighter Command strengths and
capabilities by Abteilung V, it was ignored if it did not match
conventional preconceptions.
On 16 July 1940, Abteilung V, commanded by
Oberstleutnant "Beppo"
Schmid, produced a report on the RAF and on Britain's defensive
capabilities which was adopted by the frontline commanders as a basis
for their operational plans. One of the most conspicuous failures of
the report was the lack of information on the RAF's RDF network and
control systems capabilities; it was assumed that the system was rigid
and inflexible, with the RAF fighters being "tied" to their home
bases.[148][149] An optimistic and, as it turned out, erroneous
conclusion reached was:
D. Supply Situation... At present the British aircraft industry produces about 180 to 300 first line fighters and 140 first line bombers a month. In view of the present conditions relating to production (the appearance of raw material difficulties, the disruption or breakdown of production at factories owing to air attacks, the increased vulnerability to air attack owing to the fundamental reorganisation of the aircraft industry now in progress), it is believed that for the time being output will decrease rather than increase. In the event of an intensification of air warfare it is expected that the present strength of the RAF will fall, and this decline will be aggravated by the continued decrease in production.[149]
Because of this statement, reinforced by another more detailed report,
issued on 10 August, there was a mindset in the ranks of the Luftwaffe
that the RAF would run out of frontline fighters.[148] The Luftwaffe
believed it was weakening
Fighter
Fighter Command at three times the actual
attrition rate.[150] Many times, the leadership believed Fighter
Command's strength had collapsed, only to discover that the RAF were
able to send up defensive formations at will.
Throughout the battle, the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe had to use numerous
reconnaissance sorties to make up for the poor intelligence.
Reconnaissance aircraft (initially mostly Dornier Do 17s, but
increasingly Bf 110s) proved easy prey for British fighters, as it was
seldom possible for them to be escorted by Bf 109s. Thus, the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe operated "blind" for much of the battle, unsure of its
enemy's true strengths, capabilities, and deployments. Many of the
Fighter
Fighter Command airfields were never attacked, while raids against
supposed fighter airfields fell instead on bomber or coastal defence
stations. The results of bombing and air fighting were consistently
exaggerated, due to inaccurate claims, over-enthusiastic reports and
the difficulty of confirmation over enemy territory. In the euphoric
atmosphere of perceived victory, the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe leadership became
increasingly disconnected from reality. This lack of leadership and
solid intelligence meant the Germans did not adopt consistent
strategy, even when the RAF had its back to the wall. Moreover, there
was never a systematic focus on one type of target (such as airbases,
radar stations, or aircraft factories); consequently, the already
haphazard effort was further diluted.[151]
Navigational aids[edit]
While the British were using radar for air defence more effectively
than the Germans realised, the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe attempted to press its own
offensive with advanced radio navigation systems of which the British
were initially not aware. One of these was Knickebein ("bent leg");
this system was used at night and for raids where precision was
required. It was rarely used during the Battle of Britain.[152]
Air-sea rescue[edit]
The
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe was much better prepared for the task of air-sea rescue
than the RAF, specifically tasking the
Seenotdienst
Seenotdienst unit, equipped
with about 30
Heinkel He 59
Heinkel He 59 floatplanes, with picking up downed
aircrew from the North Sea,
English Channel
English Channel and the Dover Straits. In
addition,
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe aircraft were equipped with life rafts and the
aircrew were provided with sachets of a chemical called fluorescein
which, on reacting with water, created a large, easy-to-see, bright
green patch.[153][154] In accordance with the Geneva Convention, the
He 59s were unarmed and painted white with civilian registration
markings and red crosses. Nevertheless, RAF aircraft attacked these
aircraft, as some were escorted by Bf 109s.[155]
After single He 59s were forced to land on the sea by RAF fighters, on
1 and 9 July respectively,[155][156] a controversial order was issued
to the RAF on 13 July; this stated that from 20 July, Seenotdienst
aircraft were to be shot down. One of the reasons given by Churchill
was:
We did not recognise this means of rescuing enemy pilots so they could come and bomb our civil population again ... all German air ambulances were forced down or shot down by our fighters on definite orders approved by the War Cabinet.[157]
The British also believed that their crews would report on
convoys,[154] the
Air Ministry
Air Ministry issuing a communiqué to the German
government on 14 July that Britain was
unable, however, to grant immunity to such aircraft flying over areas in which operations are in progress on land or at sea, or approaching British or Allied territory, or territory in British occupation, or British or Allied ships. Ambulance aircraft which do not comply with the above will do so at their own risk and peril[158]
The white He 59s were soon repainted in camouflage colours and armed
with defensive machine guns. Although another four He 59s were shot
down by RAF aircraft,[159] the
Seenotdienst
Seenotdienst continued to pick up
downed
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe and Allied aircrew throughout the battle, earning
praise from
Adolf Galland
Adolf Galland for their bravery.[160]
RAF strategy[edit]
Commander-in-Chief, Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding
10 Group Commander, Sir Quintin Brand
11 Group Commander, Keith Park
12 Group Commander, Trafford Leigh-Mallory
13 Group Commander, Richard Saul
The Dowding system[edit] Main article: Dowding system
Chain Home
Chain Home radar cover
During early tests of the
Chain Home
Chain Home system, the slow flow of
information from the CH radars and observers to the aircraft often
caused them to miss their "bandits". The solution, today known as the
"Dowding system", was to create a set of reporting chains to move
information from the various observation points to the pilots in their
fighters. It was named after its chief architect, "Stuffy"
Dowding.[161]
Reports from CH radars and the Observer Corps were sent directly to
Fighter
Fighter Command Headquarters (FCHQ) at Bentley Priory where they were
"filtered" to combine multiple reports of the same formations into
single tracks. Telephone operators would then forward only the
information of interest to the Group headquarters, where the map would
be re-created. This process was repeated to produce another version of
the map at the Sector level, covering a much smaller area. Looking
over their maps, Group level commanders could select squadrons to
attack particular targets. From that point the Sector operators would
give commands to the fighters to arrange an interception, as well as
return them to base. Sector stations also controlled the anti-aircraft
batteries in their area; an army officer sat beside each fighter
controller and directed the gun crews when to open and cease
fire.[162]
The
Dowding system
Dowding system dramatically improved the speed and accuracy of the
information that flowed to the pilots. During the early war period it
was expected that an average interception mission might have a 30%
chance of ever seeing their target. During the battle, the Dowding
system maintained an average rate over 75%, with several examples of
100% rates – every fighter dispatched found and intercepted its
target. In contrast,
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe fighters attempting to intercept raids
had to randomly seek their targets and often returned home having
never seen enemy aircraft. The result is what is now known as an
example of "force multiplication"; RAF fighters were as effective as
two or more
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe fighters, greatly offsetting, or overturning,
the disparity in actual numbers.
Intelligence[edit]
RAF and
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe bases, group and Luftflotte boundaries, and range of
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe Bf 109 fighters. Southern part of British radar coverage:
radar in North of
Scotland
Scotland not shown.
While
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe intelligence reports underestimated British fighter
forces and aircraft production, the British intelligence estimates
went the other way: they overestimated German aircraft production,
numbers and range of aircraft available, and numbers of Luftwaffe
pilots. In action, the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe believed from their pilot claims and
the impression given by aerial reconnaissance that the RAF was close
to defeat, and the British made strenuous efforts to overcome the
perceived advantages held by their opponents.[163]
It is unclear how much the British intercepts of the Enigma cipher,
used for high-security German radio communications, affected the
battle. Ultra, the information obtained from Enigma intercepts, gave
the highest echelons of the British command a view of German
intentions. According to F. W. Winterbotham, who was the senior Air
Staff representative in the Secret Intelligence Service,[164] Ultra
helped establish the strength and composition of the Luftwaffe's
formations, the aims of the commanders[165] and provided early warning
of some raids.[166] In early August it was decided that a small unit
would be set up at FCHQ, which would process the flow of information
from Bletchley and provide Dowding only with the most essential Ultra
material; thus the
Air Ministry
Air Ministry did not have to send a continual flow
of information to FCHQ, preserving secrecy, and Dowding was not
inundated with non-essential information.
Keith Park
Keith Park and his
controllers were also told about Ultra.[167] In a further attempt to
camouflage the existence of Ultra, Dowding created a unit named No.
421 (Reconnaissance) Flight RAF. This unit (which later became No. 91
Squadron RAF), was equipped with Hurricanes and Spitfires and sent out
aircraft to search for and report
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe formations approaching
England.[168] In addition the radio listening service (known as Y
Service), monitoring the patterns of
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe radio traffic
contributed considerably to the early warning of raids.
Air-sea rescue[edit]
Main article:
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force Marine Branch
One of the biggest oversights of the entire system was the lack of
adequate air-sea rescue organisation. The RAF had started organising a
system in 1940 with High Speed Launches (HSLs) based on flying boat
bases and at a number of overseas locations, but it was still believed
that the amount of cross-Channel traffic meant that there was no need
for a rescue service to cover these areas. Downed pilots and aircrew,
it was hoped, would be picked up by any boats or ships which happened
to be passing by. Otherwise the local life boat would be alerted,
assuming someone had seen the pilot going into the water.[169]
RAF aircrew were issued with a life jacket, nicknamed the "Mae West,"
but in 1940 it still required manual inflation, which was almost
impossible for someone who was injured or in shock. The waters of the
English Channel
English Channel and
Dover Straits
Dover Straits are cold, even in the middle of
summer, and clothing issued to RAF aircrew did little to insulate them
against these freezing conditions.[143] The RAF also imitated the
German practice of issuing fluorescein.[154] A conference in 1939 had
placed air-sea rescue under Coastal Command. Because a number of
pilots had been lost at sea during the "Channel Battle", on 22 August,
control of RAF rescue launches was passed to the local naval
authorities and 12 Lysanders were given to
Fighter
Fighter Command to help
look for pilots at sea. In all some 200 pilots and aircrew were lost
at sea during the battle. No proper air-sea rescue service was formed
until 1941.[143]
Tactics[edit]
X4474, a late production Mk I Spitfire of 19 Squadron, September 1940. During the battle 19 Squadron was part of the Duxford Wing
Fighter
Fighter formations[edit]
In the late 1930s,
Fighter
Fighter Command expected to face only bombers over
Britain, not single-engined fighters. A series of "Fighting Area
Tactics" were formulated and rigidly adhered to, involving a series of
manoeuvres designed to concentrate a squadron's firepower to bring
down bombers. RAF fighters flew in tight, v-shaped sections ("vics")
of three aircraft, with four such "sections" in tight formation. Only
the squadron leader at the front was free to watch for the enemy; the
other pilots had to concentrate on keeping station.[170] Training also
emphasised by-the-book attacks by sections breaking away in sequence.
Fighter
Fighter Command recognised the weaknesses of this structure early in
the battle, but it was felt too risky to change tactics during the
battle, because replacement pilots—often with only minimal flying
time—could not be readily retrained,[171] and inexperienced pilots
needed firm leadership in the air only rigid formations could
provide.[172] German pilots dubbed the RAF formations Idiotenreihen
("rows of idiots") because they left squadrons vulnerable to
attack.[117][173]
Front line RAF pilots were acutely aware of the inherent deficiencies
of their own tactics. A compromise was adopted whereby squadron
formations used much looser formations with one or two "weavers"
flying independently above and behind to provide increased observation
and rear protection; these tended to be the least experienced men and
were often the first to be shot down without the other pilots even
noticing that they were under attack.[117][174] During the battle, 74
Squadron under Squadron Leader Adolph "Sailor" Malan adopted a
variation of the German formation called the "fours in line astern",
which was a vast improvement on the old three aircraft "vic". Malan's
formation was later generally used by
Fighter
Fighter Command.[175]
Squadron- and higher-level deployment[edit]
The weight of the battle fell upon 11 Group. Keith Park's tactics were
to dispatch individual squadrons to intercept raids. The intention was
to subject incoming bombers to continual attacks by relatively small
numbers of fighters and try to break up the tight German formations.
Once formations had fallen apart, stragglers could be picked off one
by one. Where multiple squadrons reached a raid the procedure was for
the slower Hurricanes to tackle the bombers while the more agile
Spitfires held up the fighter escort. This ideal was not always
achieved, resulting in occasions when Spitfires and Hurricanes
reversed roles.[176] Park also issued instructions to his units to
engage in frontal attacks against the bombers, which were more
vulnerable to such attacks. Again, in the environment of fast moving,
three-dimensional air battles, few RAF fighter units were able to
attack the bombers from head-on.[176]
During the battle, some commanders, notably Leigh-Mallory, proposed
squadrons be formed into "Big Wings," consisting of at least three
squadrons, to attack the enemy en masse, a method pioneered by Douglas
Bader.
Douglas Bader
Douglas Bader commanded 242 Squadron during the battle. He also led
the Duxford Wing.
Proponents of this tactic claimed interceptions in large numbers
caused greater enemy losses while reducing their own casualties.
Opponents pointed out the big wings would take too long to form up,
and the strategy ran a greater risk of fighters being caught on the
ground refuelling. The big wing idea also caused pilots to overclaim
their kills, due to the confusion of a more intense battle zone. This
led to the belief big wings were far more effective than they
were.[177]
The issue caused intense friction between Park and Leigh-Mallory, as
12 Group was tasked with protecting 11 Group's airfields whilst Park's
squadrons intercepted incoming raids. However, the delay in forming up
Big Wings meant the formations often did not arrive at all or until
after German bombers had hit 11 Group's airfields.[178] Dowding, to
highlight the problem of the Big Wing's performance, submitted a
report compiled by Park to the
Air Ministry
Air Ministry on 15 November. In the
report, he highlighted that during the period of 11 September – 31
October, the extensive use of the
Big Wing
Big Wing had resulted in just 10
interceptions and one German aircraft destroyed, but his report was
ignored.[179] Post-war analysis agrees Dowding and Park's approach was
best for 11 Group.
Dowding's removal from his post in November 1940 has been blamed on
this struggle between Park and Leigh-Mallory's daylight strategy.
However, the intensive raids and destruction wrought during the Blitz
damaged both Dowding and Park in particular, for the failure to
produce an effective night-fighter defence system, something for which
the influential Leigh-Mallory had long criticised them.[180]
Bomber
Bomber and
Coastal Command
Coastal Command contributions[edit]
A
Bristol Blenheim
Bristol Blenheim Mk IV of 21 Squadron
Bomber
Bomber Command and
Coastal Command
Coastal Command aircraft flew offensive sorties
against targets in Germany and France during the battle.
An hour after the declaration of war,
Bomber
Bomber Command launched raids on
warships and naval ports by day, and in night raids dropped leaflets
as it was considered illegal to bomb targets which could affect
civilians. After the initial disasters of the war, with Vickers
Wellington bombers shot down in large numbers attacking Wilhelmshaven
and the slaughter of the
Fairey Battle
Fairey Battle squadrons sent to France, it
became clear that they would have to operate mainly at night to avoid
incurring very high losses.[181] Churchill came to power on 10 May
1940, and night raids on German towns began with the bombing of
Mönchen-Gladbach on the night of 11 May. The War Cabinet on 12 May
agreed that German actions justified "unrestricted warfare", and on 14
May they authorised an attack on the night of 14/15 May against oil
and rail targets in Germany. At the urging of Clement Attlee, the
Cabinet on 15 May authorised a full bombing strategy against "suitable
military objectives", even where there could be civilian casualties.
That evening, a night time bomber campaign began against the German
oil industry, communications, and forests/crops, mainly in the Ruhr
area. The RAF lacked accurate night navigation, and carried small bomb
loads.[182] As the threat mounted,
Bomber
Bomber Command changed targeting
priority on 3 June 1940 to attack the German aircraft industry. On 4
July, the
Air Ministry
Air Ministry gave
Bomber
Bomber Command orders to attack ports and
shipping. By September, the build-up of invasion barges in the Channel
ports had become a top priority target.[183]
On 7 September, the government issued a warning that the invasion
could be expected within the next few days and, that night, Bomber
Command attacked the Channel ports and supply dumps. On 13 September,
they carried out another large raid on the Channel ports, sinking 80
large barges in the port of Ostend.[184] 84 barges were sunk in
Dunkirk
Dunkirk after another raid on 17 September and by 19 September, almost
200 barges had been sunk.[183] The loss of these barges may have
contributed to Hitler's decision to postpone Operation Sea Lion
indefinitely.[183] The success of these raids was in part because the
Germans had few
Freya radar
Freya radar stations set up in France, so that air
defences of the French harbours were not nearly as good as the air
defences over Germany;
Bomber
Bomber Command had directed some 60% of its
strength against the Channel ports.
Wellington crews studying maps at a briefing with the station commander, September 1940
The
Bristol Blenheim
Bristol Blenheim units also raided German-occupied airfields
throughout July to December 1940, both during daylight hours and at
night. Although most of these raids were unproductive, there were some
successes; on 1 August, five out of twelve Blenheims sent to attack
Haamstede
Haamstede and
Evere
Evere (Brussels) were able to destroy or heavily damage
three Bf 109s of II./JG 27 and apparently kill a Staffelkapitän
identified as a
Hauptmann Albrecht von Ankum-Frank. Two other 109s
were claimed by Blenheim gunners.[185][nb 16] Another successful raid
on
Haamstede
Haamstede was made by a single Blenheim on 7 August which destroyed
one 109 of 4./JG 54, heavily damaged another and caused lighter damage
to four more.[186]
German invasion barges waiting at Boulogne Harbour, France during the Battle of Britain
There were some missions which produced an almost 100% casualty rate
amongst the Blenheims; one such operation was mounted on 13 August
1940 against a
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe airfield near
Aalborg
Aalborg in north-eastern
Denmark
Denmark by 12 aircraft of 82 Squadron. One Blenheim returned early
(the pilot was later charged and due to appear before a court martial,
but was killed on another operation); the other eleven, which reached
Denmark, were shot down, five by flak and six by Bf 109s. Of the 33
crewmen who took part in the attack, 20 were killed and 13
captured.[187]
As well as the bombing operations, Blenheim-equipped units had been
formed to carry out long-range strategic reconnaissance missions over
Germany and German-occupied territories. In this role, the Blenheims
again proved to be too slow and vulnerable against
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe fighters,
and they took constant casualties.[188][page needed]
Coastal Command
Coastal Command directed its attention towards the protection of
British shipping, and the destruction of enemy shipping. As invasion
became more likely, it participated in the strikes on French harbours
and airfields, laying mines, and mounting numerous reconnaissance
missions over the enemy-held coast. In all, some 9,180 sorties were
flown by bombers from July to October 1940. Although this was much
less than the 80,000 sorties flown by fighters, bomber crews suffered
about half the total number of casualties borne by their fighter
colleagues. The bomber contribution was, therefore, much more
dangerous on a loss-per-sortie comparison.[189]
Bomber, reconnaissance, and antisubmarine patrol operations continued
throughout these months with little respite and none of the publicity
accorded to
Fighter
Fighter Command. In his famous 20 August speech about "The
Few", praising
Fighter
Fighter Command, Churchill also made a point of
mentioning
Bomber
Bomber Command's contribution, adding that bombers were
even then striking back at Germany; this part of the speech is often
overlooked, even today.[190][191] The
Battle of Britain Chapel in
Westminster Abbey
Westminster Abbey lists in a roll of honour, 718
Bomber
Bomber Command crew
members, and 280 from
Coastal Command
Coastal Command who were killed between 10 July
and 31 October.[192]
Bomber
Bomber and
Coastal Command
Coastal Command attacks against invasion barge
concentrations in Channel ports were widely reported by the British
media during September and October 1940.[193] In what became known as
'the Battle of the Barges' RAF attacks were claimed in British
propaganda to have sunk large numbers of barges, and to have created
widespread chaos and disruption to German invasion preparations. Given
the volume of British propaganda interest in these bomber attacks
during September and earlier October, it is striking how quickly this
was overlooked once the
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain had been concluded. Even by
mid-war the bomber pilots' efforts had been largely eclipsed by a
continuing focus on the Few, this a result of the Air Ministry's
continuing valorisation of the ″fighter boys″, beginning with the
March 1941
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain propaganda pamphlet.[194]
Phases of the battle[edit]
German
Heinkel He 111
Heinkel He 111 bombers over the
English Channel
English Channel 1940
The battle covered a shifting geographical area, and there have been differing opinions on significant dates: when the Air Ministry proposed 8 August as the start, Dowding responded that operations "merged into one another almost insensibly", and proposed 10 July as the onset of increased attacks.[195] With the caution that phases drifted into each other and dates are not firm, the Royal Air Force Museum states that five main phases can be identified:[196]
26 June – 16 July: Störangriffe ("nuisance raids"), scattered small
scale probing attacks both day and night, armed reconnaissance and
mine-laying sorties. From 4 July, daylight
Kanalkampf
Kanalkampf ("the Channel
battles") against shipping.
17 July – 12 August: daylight
Kanalkampf
Kanalkampf attacks on shipping
intensify through this period, increased attacks on ports and coastal
airfields, night raids on RAF and aircraft manufacturing.
13 August – 6 September:
Adlerangriff
Adlerangriff ("Eagle Attack"), the main
assault; attempt to destroy the RAF in southern England, including
massive daylight attacks on RAF airfields, followed from 19 August by
heavy night bombing of ports and industrial cities, including suburbs
of London.
7 September – 2 October: the Blitz commences, main focus day and
night attacks on London.
3 – 31 October: large scale night bombing raids, mostly on London;
daylight attacks now confined to small scale fighter-bomber
Störangriffe raids luring RAF fighters into dogfights.
Small scale raids[edit]
The RAF night bombing campaign against military objectives in German
towns began on 11 May. The small forces available were given ambitious
objectives, but lacked night navigation capability and their isolated
inaccurate attacks were thought by the Germans to be intended to
terrorise civilians. From 4 July the RAF achieved some successes with
raids on Channel ports, anticipating the build up for an
invasion.[182][197]
Following Germany's rapid territorial gains in the Battle of France,
the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe had to reorganise its forces, set up bases along the
coast, and rebuild after heavy losses. It began small scale bombing
raids on Britain on the night of 5/6 June, and continued sporadic
attacks throughout June and July.[198] The first large-scale attack
was at night, on 18/19 June, when small raids scattered between
Yorkshire and
Kent
Kent involved in total 100 bombers.[199] These
Störangriffe ("nuisance raids") which involved only a few aeroplanes,
sometimes just one, were used to train bomber crews in both day and
night attacks, to test defences and try out methods, with most flights
at night. They found that, rather than carrying small numbers of large
high explosive bombs, it was more effective to use more small bombs,
similarly incendiaries had to cover a large area to set effective
fires. These training flights continued through August and into the
first week of September.[200] Against this, the raids also gave the
British time to assess the German tactics, and invaluable time for the
RAF fighters and anti-aircraft defences to prepare and gain
practice.[201]
Interior of RAF
Fighter
Fighter Command's Sector 'G' Operations Room at
Duxford, 1940
The attacks were widespread: over the night of 30 June alarms were set
off in 20 counties by just 20 bombers, then next day the first
daylight raids occurred during 1 July, on both Hull in Yorkshire and
Wick, Caithness. On 3 July most flights were reconnaissance sorties,
but 15 civilians were killed when bombs hit
Guildford
Guildford in Surrey.[202]
Numerous small Störangriffe raids, both day and night, were made
daily through August, September and into the winter, with aims
including bringing RAF fighters up to battle, destruction of specific
military and economic targets, and setting off air-raid warnings to
affect civilian morale: four major air-raids in August involved
hundreds of bombers, in the same month 1,062 small raids were made,
spread across the whole of Britain.[203]
Channel battles[edit]
The
Kanalkampf
Kanalkampf comprised a series of running fights over convoys in
the English Channel. It was launched partly because
Kesselring and
Sperrle were not sure about what else to do, and partly because it
gave German aircrews some training and a chance to probe the British
defences.[132] Dowding could provide only minimal shipping protection,
and these battles off the coast tended to favour the Germans, whose
bomber escorts had the advantage of altitude and outnumbered the RAF
fighters. From 9 July reconnaissance probing by
Dornier Do 17
Dornier Do 17 bombers
put a severe strain on RAF pilots and machines, with high RAF losses
to Bf 109s. When nine 141 Squadron Defiants went into action on 19
July six were lost to Bf 109s before a squadron of Hurricanes
intervened. On 25 July a coal convoy and escorting destroyers suffered
such heavy losses to attacks by Stuka dive bombers that the Admiralty
decided convoys should travel at night: the RAF shot down 16 raiders
but lost 7 aircraft. By 8 August 18 coal ships and 4 destroyers had
been sunk, but the Navy was determined to send a convoy of 20 ships
through rather than move the coal by railway. After repeated Stuka
attacks that day, six ships were badly damaged, four were sunk and
only four reached their destination. The RAF lost 19 fighters and shot
down 31 German aircraft. The Navy now cancelled all further convoys
through the Channel and sent the cargo by rail. Even so, these early
combat encounters provided both sides with experience.[204]
Main assault[edit]
The main attack upon the RAF's defences was code-named Adlerangriff
("Eagle Attack"). Intelligence reports gave Göring the impression
that the RAF was almost defeated, and raids would attract British
fighters for the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe to shoot down.[126] The strategy agreed on
6 August was to destroy
RAF Fighter Command
RAF Fighter Command across the south of
England
England in four days, then bombing of military and economic targets
was to systematically extend up to the Midlands until daylight attacks
could proceed unhindered over the whole of Britain, culminating in a
major bombing attack on London.[127][205]
Assault on RAF: radar and airfields[edit]
East Coast
Chain Home
Chain Home radar station
Poor weather delayed
Adlertag
Adlertag ("Eagle Day") until 13 August 1940. On
12 August, the first attempt was made to blind the Dowding system,
when aircraft from the specialist fighter-bomber unit Erprobungsgruppe
210 attacked four radar stations. Three were briefly taken off the air
but were back working within six hours.[206] The raids appeared to
show that British radars were difficult to knock out. The failure to
mount follow-up attacks allowed the RAF to get the stations back on
the air, and the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe neglected strikes on the supporting
infrastructure, such as phone lines and power stations, which could
have rendered the radars useless, even if the towers themselves (which
were very difficult to destroy) remained intact.[151]
Adlertag
Adlertag opened with a series of attacks, led again by Epro 210,[206]
on coastal airfields used as forward landing grounds for the RAF
fighters, as well as 'satellite airfields'[nb 17] (including Manston
and Hawkinge).[206] As the week drew on, the airfield attacks moved
further inland, and repeated raids were made on the radar chain. 15
August was "The Greatest Day" when the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe mounted the largest
number of sorties of the campaign.
Luftflotte 5 attacked the north of
England. Believing
Fighter
Fighter Command strength to be concentrated in the
south, raiding forces from
Denmark
Denmark and
Norway
Norway ran into unexpectedly
strong resistance. Inadequately escorted by Bf 110s, bombers were shot
down in large numbers. North East
England
England was attacked by 65 Heinkel
111s escorted by 34 Messerschmitt 110s, and RAF Great Driffield was
attacked by 50 unescorted Junkers 88s. Out of 115 bombers and 35
fighters sent, 75 planes were destroyed and many others damaged beyond
repair. Furthermore, due to early engagement by RAF fighters many of
the bombers dropped their payloads ineffectively early.[207] As a
result of these casualties,
Luftflotte 5 did not appear in strength
again in the campaign.
Czechoslovak fighter pilots of
No. 310 Squadron RAF
No. 310 Squadron RAF at
RAF Duxford
RAF Duxford in
1940
18 August, which had the greatest number of casualties to both sides,
has been dubbed "The Hardest Day". Following this grinding battle,
exhaustion and the weather reduced operations for most of a week,
allowing the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe to review their performance. "The Hardest Day"
had sounded the end for the Ju 87 in the campaign.[208] This veteran
of
Blitzkrieg
Blitzkrieg was too vulnerable to fighters to operate over Britain.
So as to preserve the Stuka force, Göring withdrew them from the
fighting. This removed the main
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe precision-bombing weapon and
shifted the burden of pinpoint attacks on the already-stretched Erpro
210. The Bf 110 proved too clumsy for dogfighting with single-engined
fighters, and its participation was scaled back. It would only be used
when range required it or when sufficient single-engined escort could
not be provided for the bombers.
Pilots of
No. 19 Squadron RAF
No. 19 Squadron RAF relax in the crew room at RAF Fowlmere,
1940
Göring made yet another fateful decision: to order more bomber
escorts at the expense of free-hunting sweeps. To achieve this, the
weight of the attack now fell on Luftflotte 2, and the bulk of the Bf
109s in
Luftflotte 3
Luftflotte 3 were transferred to Kesselring's command,
reinforcing the fighter bases in the Pas-de-Calais. Stripped of its
fighters,
Luftflotte 3
Luftflotte 3 would concentrate on the night bombing
campaign. Göring, expressing disappointment with the fighter
performance thus far in the campaign, also made sweeping changes in
the command structure of the fighter units, replacing many
Geschwaderkommodore with younger, more aggressive pilots like Adolf
Galland and Werner Mölders.[209]
Finally, Göring stopped the attacks on the radar chain. These were
seen as unsuccessful, and neither the
Reichsmarschall
Reichsmarschall nor his
subordinates realised how vital the
Chain Home
Chain Home stations were to the
defence systems. It was known that radar provided some early warning
of raids, but the belief among German fighter pilots was that anything
bringing up the "Tommies" to fight was to be encouraged.[citation
needed]
Raids on British cities[edit]
On the afternoon of 15 August,
Hauptmann
Walter Rubensdörffer
Walter Rubensdörffer leading
Erprobungsgruppe 210 mistakenly bombed
Croydon
Croydon airfield (on the
outskirts of London) instead of the intended target, RAF Kenley.[210]
German intelligence reports made the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe optimistic that the
RAF, thought to be dependent on local air control, was struggling with
supply problems and pilot losses. After a major raid attacking Biggin
Hill on 18 August,
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe aircrew said they had been unopposed, the
airfield was "completely destroyed", and asked "Is
England
England already
finished?" In accordance with the strategy agreed on 6 August, defeat
of the RAF was to be followed by bombing military and economic
targets, systematically extending up to the Midlands.[211]
Göring ordered attacks on aircraft factories on 19 August 1940.[184]
Sixty raids on the night of 19/20 August targeted the aircraft
industry and harbours, and bombs fell on suburban areas around London:
Croydon, Wimbledon and the Maldens.[212] Night raids were made on
21/22 August on Aberdeen,
Bristol
Bristol and South Wales. That morning, bombs
were dropped on Harrow and Wealdstone, on the outskirts of London.
Overnight on 22/23 August, the output of an aircraft factory at Filton
near
Bristol
Bristol was drastically affected by a raid in which Ju88 bombers
released over 16 tons of high explosive bombs. On the night of 23/24
August over 200 bombers attacked the
Fort Dunlop
Fort Dunlop tyre factory in
Birmingham, with a significant effect on production. A sustained
bombing campaign began on 24 August with the largest raid so far,
killing 100 in Portsmouth, and that night, several areas of London
were bombed; the East End was set ablaze and bombs landed on central
London. Some historians believe that these bombs were dropped
accidentally by a group of Heinkel He 111s which had failed to find
their target; this account has been contested.[213]
More night raids were made around
London
London on 24/25 August, when bombs
fell on Croydon, Banstead, Lewisham, Uxbridge, Harrow and Hayes.
London
London was on red alert over the night of 28/29 August, with bombs
reported in Finchley, St Pancras, Wembley, Wood Green, Southgate, Old
Kent
Kent Road, Mill Hill, Ilford,
Chigwell
Chigwell and Hendon.[128]
Attacks on airfields from 24 August[edit]
Polish
303 squadron
303 squadron pilots, 1940. Left to right: P/O Ferić, Flt Lt
Kent, F/O Grzeszczak, P/O Radomski, P/O Zumbach, P/O Łokuciewski, F/O
Henneberg, Sgt. Rogowski, Sgt. Szaposznikow.
Göring's directive issued on 23 August 1940 ordered ceaseless attacks
on the aircraft industry and on RAF ground organisation to force the
RAF to use its fighters, continuing the tactic of luring them up to be
destroyed, and added that focussed attacks were to be made on RAF
airfields.[213]
From 24 August onwards, the battle was a fight between Kesselring's
Luftflotte 2 and Park's 11 Group. The
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe concentrated all their
strength on knocking out
Fighter
Fighter Command and made repeated attacks on
the airfields. Of the 33 heavy attacks in the following two weeks, 24
were against airfields. The key sector stations were hit repeatedly:
Biggin Hill
Biggin Hill and Hornchurch four times each; Debden and North Weald
twice each. Croydon, Gravesend, Rochford, Hawkinge and Manston were
also attacked in strength. Coastal Command's Eastchurch was bombed at
least seven times because it was believed to be a
Fighter
Fighter Command
aerodrome. At times these raids caused some damage to the sector
stations, threatening the integrity of the Dowding system.
To offset some losses, some 58
Fleet Air Arm
Fleet Air Arm fighter pilot volunteers
were seconded to RAF squadrons, and a similar number of former Fairey
Battle pilots were used. Most replacements from Operational Training
Units (OTUs) had as little as nine hours flying time and no gunnery or
air-to-air combat training. At this point, the multinational nature of
Fighter
Fighter Command came to the fore. Many squadrons and personnel from
the air forces of the Dominions were already attached to the RAF,
including top level commanders – Australians, Canadians, New
Zealanders, Rhodesians and South Africans. In addition, there were
other nationalities represented, including Free French, Belgian and a
Jewish pilot from the British mandate of Palestine.
They were bolstered by the arrival of fresh Czechoslovak and Polish
squadrons. These had been held back by Dowding, who mistakenly thought
non-English speaking aircrew would have trouble working within his
control system: Polish and Czech fliers proved to be especially
effective. The pre-war
Polish Air Force
Polish Air Force had lengthy and extensive
training, and high standards; with
Poland
Poland conquered and under brutal
German occupation, the pilots of No. 303 (Polish) Squadron, the
highest-scoring Allied unit,[214] were strongly motivated. Josef
František, a Czech regular airman who had flown from the occupation
of his own country to join the Polish and then French air forces
before arriving in Britain, flew as a guest of
303 Squadron
303 Squadron and was
ultimately credited with the highest "RAF score" in the Battle of
Britain.[215]
The RAF had the advantage of fighting over home territory. Pilots who
bailed out of their downed aircraft could be back at their airfields
within hours, while if low on fuel and/or ammunition they could be
immediately rearmed.[216] One RAF pilot interviewed in late 1940 had
been shot down five times during the Battle of Britain, but was able
to crash land in Britain or bail out each time.[217] For Luftwaffe
aircrews, a bailout over
England
England meant capture – in the critical
August period, almost exactly as many
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe pilots were taken
prisoner as were killed[218] – while parachuting into the English
Channel often meant drowning or death from exposure. Morale began to
suffer, and [Kanalkrankheit] ("Channel sickness") – a form of combat
fatigue – began to appear among the German pilots. Their replacement
problem became even worse than the British.
Assessment of attempt to destroy the RAF[edit]
The effect of the German attacks on airfields is unclear. According to
Stephen Bungay, Dowding, in a letter to Hugh Trenchard[219]
accompanying Park's report on the period 8 August – 10 September
1940, states that the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe "achieved very little" in the last
week of August and the first week of September.[220] The only Sector
Station to be shut down operationally was Biggin Hill, and it was
non-operational for just two hours. Dowding admitted 11 Group's
efficiency was impaired but, despite serious damage to some airfields,
only two out of 13 heavily attacked airfields were down for more than
a few hours. The German refocus on
London
London was not critical.[220]
Retired air marshal Peter Dye, head of the RAF Museum, discussed the
logistics of the battle in 2000[221] and 2010,[222] dealing
specifically with the single-seat fighters. Dye contends that not only
was British aircraft production replacing aircraft, but replacement
pilots were keeping pace with losses. The number of pilots in RAF
Fighter
Fighter Command increased during July, August and September. The
figures indicate the number of pilots available never decreased: from
July, 1,200 were available, and from 1 August, 1,400 were available.
Just over that number were in the field by September. In October the
figure was nearly 1,600. By 1 November 1,800 were available.
Throughout the battle, the RAF had more fighter pilots available than
the Luftwaffe.[221][222] Although the RAF's reserves of single seat
fighters fell during July, the wastage was made up for by an efficient
Civilian Repair Organisation
Civilian Repair Organisation (CRO), which by December had repaired and
put back into service some 4,955 aircraft,[223] and by aircraft held
at Air Servicing Unit (ASU) airfields.[224]
Pilots of No. 66 Squadron at Gravesend, September 1940
Richard Overy
Richard Overy agrees with Dye and Bungay. Overy asserts only one
airfield was temporarily put out of action and "only" 103 pilots were
lost. British fighter production produced 496 new aircraft in July and
467 in August, and another 467 in September (not counting repaired
aircraft), covering the losses of August and September. Overy
indicates the number of serviceable and total strength returns reveal
an increase in fighters from 3 August to 7 September, 1,061 on
strength and 708 serviceable to 1,161 on strength and 746
serviceable.[225] Moreover, Overy points out that the number of RAF
fighter pilots grew by one-third between June and August 1940.
Personnel records show a constant supply of around 1,400 pilots in the
crucial weeks of the battle. In the second half of September it
reached 1,500. The shortfall of pilots was never above 10%. The
Germans never had more than between 1,100 and 1,200 pilots, a
deficiency of up to one-third. "If
Fighter
Fighter Command were 'the few', the
German fighter pilots were fewer".[226]
Other scholars assert that this period was the most dangerous of all.
In The Narrow Margin, published in 1961, historians Derek Wood and
Derek Dempster believed that the two weeks from 24 August to 6
September represented a real danger. According to them, from 24 August
to 6 September 295 fighters had been totally destroyed and 171 badly
damaged, against a total output of 269 new and repaired Spitfires and
Hurricanes. They assert that 103 pilots were killed or missing and 128
were wounded, which represented a total wastage of 120 pilots per week
out of a fighting strength of just fewer than 1,000. They conclude
that during August no more than 260 fighter pilots were turned out by
OTUs and casualties in the same month were just over 300. A full
squadron establishment was 26 pilots whereas the average in August was
16. In their assessment, the RAF was losing the battle.[227] Denis
Richards, in his 1953 contribution to the official British account
History of the Second World War, agreed that lack of pilots,
especially experienced ones, was the RAF's greatest problem. He states
that between 8 and 18 August 154 RAF pilots were killed, severely
wounded, or missing, while only 63 new pilots were trained.
Availability of aircraft was also a serious issue. While its reserves
during the
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain never declined to a half dozen planes as
some later claimed, Richards describes 24 August to 6 September as the
critical period because during these two weeks Germany destroyed far
more aircraft through its attacks on 11 Group's southeast bases than
Britain was producing. Three more weeks of such a pace would indeed
have exhausted aircraft reserves. Germany had seen heavy losses of
pilots and aircraft as well however, thus its shift to night-time
attacks in September. On 7 September RAF aircraft losses fell below
British production and remained so until the end of the war.[228]
Day and night attacks on London: start of the Blitz[edit]
Main articles:
The Blitz
The Blitz and
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Day
Calais, September 1940. Göring giving a speech to pilots about the
change in tactics: to bomb
London
London instead of the airfields
Hitler's "Directive No. 17 – For the conduct of air and sea warfare
against England" issued on 1 August 1940, reserved to himself the
right to decide on terror attacks as measures of reprisal.[58] Hitler
issued a directive that
London
London was not to be bombed save on his sole
instruction.[229] In preparation, detailed target plans under the code
name Operation Loge for raids on communications, power stations,
armaments works and docks in the Port of
London
London were distributed to
the Fliegerkorps in July. The port areas were crowded next to
residential housing and civilian casualties would be expected, but
this would combine military and economic targets with indirect effects
on morale. The strategy agreed on 6 August was for raids on military
and economic targets in towns and cities to culminate in a major
attack on London.[230] In mid August raids were made on targets on the
outskirts of London.[213]
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe doctrine included the possibility of retaliatory attacks on
cities, and since 11 May small scale night raids by RAF
Bomber
Bomber Command
had frequently bombed residential areas. The Germans assumed this was
deliberate, and as the raids increased in frequency and scale the
population grew impatient for measures of revenge.[230] On 25 August
1940, 81 bombers of
Bomber
Bomber Command were sent out to raid industrial
and commercial targets in Berlin. Clouds prevented accurate
identification and the bombs fell across the city, causing some
casualties among the civilian population as well as damage to
residential areas.[231] Continuing RAF raids on Berlin led to Hitler
withdrawing his directive on 30 August,[232] and giving the go-ahead
to the planned bombing offensive.[230] On 3 September Göring planned
to bomb
London
London daily, with General Albert Kesselring's enthusiastic
support, having received reports the average strength of RAF squadrons
was down to five or seven fighters out of twelve and their airfields
in the area were out of action. Hitler issued a directive on 5
September to attack cities including London.[233][234] In his widely
publicised speech delivered on 4 September 1940, Hitler condemned the
bombing of Berlin and presented the planned attacks on
London
London as
reprisals. The first daylight raid was titled Vergeltungsangriff
(revenge attack).[235]
Smoke rising from fires in the
London
London docks, following bombing on 7
September
Heinkel He 111
Heinkel He 111 bomber over the
Surrey Commercial Docks
Surrey Commercial Docks in South London
and
Wapping
Wapping and the
Isle of Dogs
Isle of Dogs in the East End of
London
London on 7
September 1940
On 7 September, a massive series of raids involving nearly four
hundred bombers and more than six hundred fighters targeted docks in
the East End of London, day and night. The RAF anticipated attacks on
airfields and 11 Group rose to meet them, in greater numbers than the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe expected. The first official deployment of 12 Group's
Leigh-Mallory's
Big Wing
Big Wing took twenty minutes to form up, missing its
intended target, but encountering another formation of bombers while
still climbing. They returned, apologetic about their limited success,
and blamed the delay on being scrambled too late.[236][237]
Air-raid shelter in London, 1940
The German press jubilantly announced that "one great cloud of smoke
stretches tonight from the middle of
London
London to the mouth of the
Thames." Reports reflected the briefings given to crews before the
raids – "Everyone knew about the last cowardly attacks on German
cities, and thought about wives, mothers and children. And then came
that word 'Vengeance!'" Pilots reported seeing ruined airfields as
they flew towards London, appearances which gave intelligence reports
the impression of devastated defences. Göring maintained that the RAF
was close to defeat, making invasion feasible.[238]
Fighter
Fighter Command had been at its lowest ebb, short of men and machines,
and the break from airfield attacks allowed them to recover. 11 Group
had considerable success in breaking up daytime raids. 12 Group
repeatedly disobeyed orders and failed to meet requests to protect 11
Group airfields, but their experiments with increasingly large Big
Wings had some success. The
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe began to abandon their morning
raids, with attacks on
London
London starting late in the afternoon for
fifty-seven consecutive nights.[239]
Members of the
London
London Auxiliary Firefighting Service
The most damaging aspect to the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe of targeting
London
London was the
increase in range. The
Bf 109E
Bf 109E escorts had a limited fuel capacity
resulting in only a 660 km (410 mile) maximum range solely on
internal fuel,[240] and when they arrived had only 10 minutes of
flying time before turning for home, leaving the bombers undefended by
fighter escorts. Its eventual stablemate, the Focke-Wulf Fw 190A, was
flying only in prototype form in the summer of 1940; the first 28 Fw
190s were not delivered until November 1940. The Fw 190A-1 had a
maximum range of 940 km (584 miles) on internal fuel, 40% greater
than the Bf 109E.[241] The Messerschmitt Bf 109E-7 corrected this
deficiency by adding a ventral centre-line ordnance rack to take
either an SC 250 bomb or a standard 300 litre
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe drop tank to
double the range to 1,325 km (820 mi). The ordnance rack was
not retrofitted to earlier Bf 109Es until October 1940.
On 14 September, Hitler chaired a meeting with the OKW staff. Göring
was in France directing the decisive battle, so
Erhard Milch
Erhard Milch deputised
for him.[242] Hitler asked "Should we call it off altogether?" General
Hans Jeschonnek,
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe Chief of Staff, begged for a last chance to
defeat the RAF and for permission to launch attacks on civilian
residential areas to cause mass panic. Hitler refused the latter,
perhaps unaware of how much damage had already been done to civilian
targets. He reserved for himself the power to unleash the terror
weapon. Instead political will was to be broken by destroying the
material infrastructure, the weapons industry, and stocks of fuel and
food.
Zehbe's Dornier falling on Victoria Station after being rammed by Ray Holmes, 15 September 1940
On 15 September, two massive waves of German attacks were decisively
repulsed by the RAF by deploying every aircraft in 11 Group. Sixty
German and twenty-six RAF aircraft were shot down. The action was the
climax of the Battle of Britain.[243]
Two days after the German defeat Hitler postponed preparations for the
invasion of Britain. Henceforth, in the face of mounting losses in
men, aircraft and the lack of adequate replacements, the Luftwaffe
completed their gradual shift from daylight bomber raids and continued
with nighttime bombing. 15 September is commemorated as Battle of
Britain Day.
Night time Blitz, fighter-bomber day raids[edit]
Main article: The Blitz
At the 14 September OKW conference, Hitler acknowledged that the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe had still not gained the air superiority needed for the
Operation Sealion invasion. In agreement with Raeder's written
recommendation, Hitler said the campaign was to intensify regardless
of invasion plans: "The decisive thing is the ceaseless continuation
of air attacks."
Jeschonnek
Jeschonnek proposed attacking residential areas to
cause "mass panic", but Hitler turned this down: he reserved to
himself the option of terror bombing. British morale was to be broken
by destroying infrastructure, armaments manufacturing, fuel and food
stocks. On 16 September, Göring gave the order for this change in
strategy.[59] This new phase was to be the first independent strategic
bombing campaign, in hopes of a political success forcing the British
to give up.[60] Hitler hoped it might result in "eight million going
mad" (referring to the population of
London
London in 1940), which would
"cause a catastrophe" for the British. In those circumstances, Hitler
said, "even a small invasion might go a long way". Hitler was against
cancelling the invasion as "the cancellation would reach the ears of
the enemy and strengthen his resolve".[nb 18][nb 19] On 19 September,
Hitler ordered a reduction in work on Sealion.[245] He doubted if
strategic bombing could achieve its aims, but ending the air war would
be an open admission of defeat. He had to maintain the appearance of
concentration on defeating Britain, to conceal from
Joseph Stalin
Joseph Stalin his
covert aim to invade the Soviet Union.[246]
Gun camera
Gun camera film shows tracer ammunition from a Supermarine Spitfire
Mark I of 609 Squadron, flown by
Flight Lieutenant
Flight Lieutenant J H G McArthur,
hitting a
Heinkel He 111
Heinkel He 111 on its starboard quarter. These aircraft were
part of a large formation from KG 53 and 55 which attacked the Bristol
Aeroplane Company's works at Filton, Bristol, just before midday on 25
September 1940.
Throughout the battle, most
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe bombing raids had been at
night.[247] They increasingly suffered unsustainable losses in
daylight raids, and the last massive daytime attacks were on 15
September. A raid of 70 bombers on 18 September also suffered badly,
and day raids were gradually phased out leaving the main attacks at
night.
Fighter
Fighter command still lacked any successful way of intercepting
night-time raiders, the night fighter force was mostly Blenheims and
Beaufighters, and lacked airborne radar so had no way of finding the
bombers. Anti-aircraft guns were diverted to London's defences, but
had a much reduced success rate against night attacks.[248]
From mid September,
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe daylight bombing was gradually taken
over by a Bf 109 fighters, adapted to take one 250 kg bomb. Small
groups of fighter-bombers would carry out Störangriffe raids escorted
by large escort formations of about 200 to 300 combat fighters. They
flew at altitudes over 20,000 feet (6,100 m) where the Bf109 had
an advantage over RAF fighters, except the Spitfire.[nb 20][nb
21][251] The raids disturbed civilians, and continued the war of
attrition against
Fighter
Fighter Command. The raids were intended to carry
out precision bombing on military or economic targets, but it was hard
to achieve sufficient accuracy with the single bomb. Sometimes, when
attacked, the fighter-bombers had to jettison the bomb to function as
fighters. The RAF was at a disadvantage, and changed defensive tactics
by introducing standing patrols of Spitfires at high altitude to
monitor incoming raids. On a sighting, other patrols at lower altitude
would fly up to join the battle.[252][246]
A
Junkers Ju 88
Junkers Ju 88 returning from a raid on
London
London was shot down in Kent
on 27 September resulting in the Battle of Graveney Marsh, the last
action between British and foreign military forces on British mainland
soil.[253]
German bombing of Britain reached its peak in October and November
1940. In post war interrogation,
Wilhelm Keitel
Wilhelm Keitel described the aims as
economic blockade, in conjunction with submarine warfare, and
attrition of Britain's military and economic resources. The Luftwaffe
wanted to achieve victory on its own, and was reluctant to cooperate
with the navy. Their strategy for blockade was to destroy ports and
storage facilities in towns and cities. Priorities were based on the
pattern of trade and distribution, so for these months
London
London was the
main target. In November their attention turned to other ports and
industrial targets around Britain.[254]
Hitler postponed the Sealion invasion on 13 October "until the spring
of 1941". It was not until Hitler's Directive 21 was issued, on 18
December 1940, that the threat to Britain of invasion finally
ended.[184]
Royal family[edit]
During the battle, and for the rest of the war, an important factor in
keeping public morale high was the continued presence in
London
London of
King
George VI
George VI and his wife Queen Elizabeth. When war broke out in
1939, the King and Queen decided to stay in
London
London and not flee to
Canada, as had been suggested.[nb 22]
George VI
George VI and Elizabeth
officially stayed in
Buckingham Palace
Buckingham Palace throughout the war, although
they often spent weekends at
Windsor Castle
Windsor Castle to visit their daughters,
Elizabeth (the future queen) and Margaret.[255]
Buckingham Palace
Buckingham Palace was
damaged by bombs which landed in the grounds on 10 September and, on
13 September, more serious damage was caused by two bombs which
destroyed the Royal Chapel. The royal couple were in a small sitting
room about 80 yards from where the bombs exploded.[256][257] On 24
September, in recognition of the bravery of civilians, King George VI
inaugurated the award of the George Cross.
Attrition statistics[edit]
See also: Confirmation and overclaiming of aerial victories
Overall, by 2 November, the RAF fielded 1,796 pilots, an increase of
over 40% from July 1940's count of 1,259 pilots.[258] Based on German
sources (from a
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe intelligence officer Otto Bechtle attached
to
KG 2
KG 2 in February 1944) translated by the Air Historical Branch,
Stephen Bungay asserts German fighter and bomber "strength" declined
without recovery, and that from August–December 1940, the German
fighter and bomber strength declined by 30 and 25 percent.[8] In
contrast, Williamson Murray, argues (using translations by the Air
Historical Branch) that 1,380 German bombers were on strength on 29
June 1940,[6][259] 1,420 bombers on 28 September,[260] 1,423 level
bombers on 2 November[261] and 1,393 bombers on 30 November 1940.[261]
In July–September the number of
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe pilots available fell by
136, but the number of operational pilots had shrunk by 171 by
September. The training organisation of the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe was failing to
replace losses. German fighter pilots, in contrast to popular
perception, were not afforded training or rest rotations unlike their
British counterparts.[115] The first week of September accounted for
25% of the
Fighter
Fighter Command, and 24% of the Luftwaffe's overall
losses.[262] Between the dates 26 August – 6 September, on only one
day (1 September) did the Germans destroy more aircraft than they
lost. Losses were 325 German and 248 British.[263]
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe losses for August numbered 774 aircraft to all causes,
representing 18.5% of all combat aircraft at the beginning of the
month.[264]
Fighter
Fighter Command's losses in August were 426 fighters
destroyed,[265] amounting to 40 per cent of 1,061 fighters available
on 3 August.[266] In addition, 99 German bombers and 27 other types
were destroyed between 1 and 29 August.[267]
From July to September, the Luftwaffe's loss records indicate the loss
of 1,636 aircraft, 1,184 to enemy action.[259] This represented 47% of
the initial strength of single-engined fighters, 66% of twin-engined
fighters, and 45% of bombers. This indicates the Germans were running
out of aircrew as well as aircraft.[268]
Throughout the battle, the Germans greatly underestimated the size of
the RAF and the scale of British aircraft production. Across the
Channel, the Air Intelligence division of the Air Ministry
consistently overestimated the size of the German air enemy and the
productive capacity of the German aviation industry. As the battle was
fought, both sides exaggerated the losses inflicted on the other by an
equally large margin. However, the intelligence picture formed before
the battle encouraged the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe to believe that such losses pushed
Fighter
Fighter Command to the very edge of defeat, while the exaggerated
picture of German air strength persuaded the RAF that the threat it
faced was larger and more dangerous than was the case.[269] This led
the British to the conclusion that another fortnight of attacks on
airfields might force
Fighter
Fighter Command to withdraw their squadrons from
the south of England. The German misconception, on the other hand,
encouraged first complacency, then strategic misjudgement. The shift
of targets from air bases to industry and communications was taken
because it was assumed that
Fighter
Fighter Command was virtually
eliminated.[270]
Between 24 August and 4 September, German serviceability rates, which
were acceptable at Stuka units, were running at 75% with Bf 109s, 70%
with bombers and 65% with Bf 110s, indicating a shortage of spare
parts. All units were well below established strength. The attrition
was beginning to affect the fighters in particular."[271] By 14
September, the Luftwaffe's Bf 109 Geschwader possessed only 67% of
their operational crews against authorised aircraft. For Bf 110 units
it was 46 per cent; and for bombers it was 59 per cent. A week later
the figures had dropped to 64 per cent, 52% and 52 per cent.[268]
Serviceability rates in
Fighter
Fighter Command's fighter squadrons, between
24 August and 7 September, were listed as: 64.8% on 24 August; 64.7%
on 31 August and 64.25% on 7 September 1940.[266]
Due to the failure of the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe to establish air supremacy, a
conference assembled on 14 September at Hitler's headquarters. Hitler
concluded that air superiority had not yet been established and
"promised to review the situation on 17 September for possible
landings on 27 September or 8 October. Three days later, when the
evidence was clear that the German Air Force had greatly exaggerated
the extent of their successes against the RAF, Hitler postponed Sea
Lion indefinitely."[272]
Propaganda[edit]
Propaganda was an important element of the air war which began to
develop over Britain from 18 June 1940 onwards, when the Luftwaffe
began small, probing daylight raids to test RAF defences. One of many
examples of these small-scale raids was the destruction of a school at
Polruan in Cornwall, by a single raider. Into early July, the British
media's focus on the air battles increased steadily, the press,
magazines, BBC radio and newsreels daily conveying the contents of Air
Ministry communiques.[273] The German OKW communiques matched
Britain's efforts in claiming for the upper hand.[274]
Central to the propaganda war on both sides of the Channel were
aircraft claims, this discussed under 'Attrition statistics'. These
daily claims were important both for sustaining British home front
morale and persuading America to support Britain, and were produced by
the Air Ministry's Air Intelligence branch. Under pressure from
American journalists and broadcasters to prove that the RAF's claims
were genuine, RAF intelligence compared pilots' claims with actual
aircraft wrecks and those seen to crash into the sea. It was soon
realised that there was a discrepancy between the two, but the Air
Ministry decided not to reveal this.[275] In fact, it was not until
May 1947 that the actual figures were released to the public, by which
time it was of far less importance. Many though refused to believe the
revised figures, including Douglas Bader.[276]
The place of the
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain in British popular memory is due in
no small part to the successful propaganda campaign waged by the Air
Ministry, between July–October 1940, but also in valorising the Few
from March 1941 onwards. The publication of the immensely successful
3d pamphlet, The Battle of Britain, saw huge international sales,
leading even Goebbels to admire its propaganda value. Focusing only
upon the Few, with no mention of RAF bomber attacks against invasion
barges, the
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain was soon established as a major victory
for
Fighter
Fighter Command. This in turn inspired a wide range of feature
films, books, magazines, works of art, poetry, radio plays and MOI
short films.
It is notable that this most impressive of British victories had, in
essence, been proclaimed within only five months of the cessation of
large-scale daylight air battles, and without reference to Hitler and
the OKW's reasoning for not proceeding with Operation Sea Lion. The
continuing post-war popularity of the
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain is in fact
directly attributable to the Air Ministry's latter-1940 air
communiques, the media in turn broadcasting or publishing RAF aircraft
claims. Noted above, this in turn led to the March 1941 pamphlet,
which inspired a wide range of cultural responses to the Few, and the
Battle of Britain. The
Air Ministry
Air Ministry built upon this with the
development of the
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Sunday commemoration, also
supported the
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain clasp for issue to the Few in 1945,
and from 1945
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Week.
The Battle of Britain window in
Westminster Abbey
Westminster Abbey was also encouraged by the Air Ministry, Lords
Trenchard and Dowding on its committee. By July 1947 when the window
was unveiled, the
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain had already attained central
prominence as
Fighter
Fighter Command's most notable victory, the Few alone
credited with preventing invasion in 1940. Although given widespread
media coverage in September and October 1940, RAF
Bomber
Bomber and Coastal
Command raids against invasion barge concentrations had already been
forgotten by war's end.
Aftermath[edit]
The Battle of Britain marked the first major defeat of Hitler's
military forces, with air superiority seen as the key to victory.[277]
Pre-war theories had led to exaggerated fears of strategic bombing,
and UK public opinion was buoyed by coming through the ordeal.[278]
For the RAF,
Fighter
Fighter Command had achieved a great victory in
successfully carrying out Sir Thomas Inskip's 1937 air policy of
preventing the Germans from knocking Britain out of the war. Churchill
concluded his famous 18 June 'Battle of Britain' speech in the House
of Commons by referring to pilots and aircrew who fought the Battle:
"... if the
British Empire
British Empire and its Commonwealth lasts for a
thousand years, men will still say, 'This was their finest
hour.'"[279][nb 23]
The battle also significantly shifted American opinion. During the
battle, many Americans accepted the view promoted by Joseph Kennedy,
the American ambassador in London, who believed that the United
Kingdom could not survive. Roosevelt wanted a second opinion, and sent
"Wild Bill" Donovan on a brief visit to the UK; he became convinced
the UK would survive and should be supported in every possible
way.[280][281] Before the end of the year American journalist Ralph
Ingersoll, after returning from Britain, published a book concluding
that "
Adolf Hitler
Adolf Hitler met his first defeat in eight years" in what might
"go down in history as a battle as important as Waterloo or
Gettysburg". The turning point was when the Germans reduced the
intensity of the Blitz after 15 September. According to Ingersoll,
"[a] majority of responsible British officers who fought through this
battle believe that if Hitler and Göring had had the courage and the
resources to lose 200 planes a day for the next five days, nothing
could have saved London"; instead, "[the Luftwaffe's] morale in combat
is definitely broken, and the RAF has been gaining in strength each
week."[282]
Both sides in the battle made exaggerated claims of numbers of enemy
aircraft shot down. In general, claims were two to three times the
actual numbers, because of the confusion of fighting in dynamic
three-dimensional air battles. Postwar analysis of records has shown
that between July and September, the RAF claimed 2,698 kills, while
the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe fighters claimed 3,198 RAF aircraft downed.[citation
needed] Total losses, and start and end dates for recorded losses,
vary for both sides.
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe losses from 10 July to 30 October 1940
total 1,977 aircraft, including 243 twin- and 569 single-engined
fighters, 822 bombers and 343 non combat types.[14] In the same
period,
RAF Fighter Command
RAF Fighter Command aircraft losses number 1,087, including 53
twin-engined fighters.[citation needed] To the RAF figure should be
added 376
Bomber
Bomber Command and 148
Coastal Command
Coastal Command aircraft lost
conducting bombing, mining, and reconnaissance operations in defence
of the country.[8]
There is a consensus among historians that the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe were unable
to crush the RAF.
Stephen Bungay described Dowding and Park's strategy
of choosing when to engage the enemy whilst maintaining a coherent
force as vindicated; their leadership, and the subsequent debates
about strategy and tactics, however, had created enmity among RAF
senior commanders and both were sacked from their posts in the
immediate aftermath of the battle.[283] All things considered, the RAF
proved to be a robust and capable organisation which was to use all
the modern resources available to it to the maximum advantage.[284]
Richard Evans wrote:
Irrespective of whether Hitler was really set on this course, he simply lacked the resources to establish the air superiority that was the sine qua non-of a successful crossing of the English Channel. A third of the initial strength of the German air force, the Luftwaffe, had been lost in the western campaign in the spring. The Germans lacked the trained pilots, the effective fighter aircraft, and the heavy bombers that would have been needed.[285][nb 24]
The Germans launched some spectacular attacks against important
British industries, but they could not destroy the British industrial
potential, and made little systematic effort to do so. Hindsight does
not disguise the fact the threat to
Fighter
Fighter Command was very real, and
for the participants it seemed as if there was a narrow margin between
victory and defeat. Nevertheless, even if the German attacks on the 11
Group airfields which guarded southeast
England
England and the approaches to
London
London had continued, the RAF could have withdrawn to the Midlands out
of German fighter range and continued the battle from there.[287] The
victory was as much psychological as physical. Writes Alfred Price:
The truth of the matter, borne out by the events of 18 August is more
prosaic: neither by attacking the airfields, nor by attacking London,
was the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe likely to destroy
Fighter
Fighter Command. Given the size of
the British fighter force and the general high quality of its
equipment, training and morale, the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe could have achieved no
more than a Pyrrhic victory. During the action on 18 August it had
cost the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe five trained aircrew killed, wounded or taken
prisoner, for each British fighter pilot killed or wounded; the ratio
was similar on other days in the battle. And this ratio of 5:1 was
very close to that between the number of German aircrew involved in
the battle and those in
Fighter
Fighter Command. In other words the two sides
were suffering almost the same losses in trained aircrew, in
proportion to their overall strengths. In the Battle of Britain, for
the first time during the Second World War, the German war machine had
set itself a major task which it patently failed to achieve, and so
demonstrated that it was not invincible. In stiffening the resolve of
those determined to resist Hitler the battle was an important turning
point in the conflict.[288]
The British victory in the
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain was achieved at a heavy
cost. Total British civilian losses from July to December 1940 were
23,002 dead and 32,138 wounded, with one of the largest single raids
on 19 December 1940, in which almost 3,000 civilians died. With the
culmination of the concentrated daylight raids, Britain was able to
rebuild its military forces and establish itself as an Allied
stronghold, later serving as a base from which the Liberation of
Western Europe was launched.[23]
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Day[edit]
World War II
World War II poster containing the famous lines by Winston Churchill
The Battle of Britain anniversary parade at
Buckingham Palace
Buckingham Palace in 1943.
Winston Churchill
Winston Churchill summed up the effect of the battle and the
contribution of RAF
Fighter
Fighter Command, RAF
Bomber
Bomber Command, RAF Coastal
Command and the
Fleet Air Arm
Fleet Air Arm with the words, "Never in the field of
human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few".[289] Pilots who
fought in the battle have been known as
The Few
The Few ever since; at times
being specially commemorated on 15 September, "
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Day".
On this day in 1940, the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe embarked on their largest bombing
attack yet, forcing the engagement of the entirety of the RAF in
defence of
London
London and the South East, which resulted in a decisive
British victory that proved to mark a turning point in Britain's
favour.[290][291]
Within the Commonwealth,
Battle of Britain Day has been observed more
usually on the third Sunday in September, and even on the 2nd Thursday
in September in some areas in the British Channel Islands.
The day has been observed by many artists over the years, often with
works that show the battle itself. Many mixed media artists have also
created pieces in honour of the Battle of Britain.[292]
Memorials and museums[edit]
Plans for the
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain window in
Westminster Abbey
Westminster Abbey were begun
during wartime, the committee chaired by Lords Trenchard and Dowding.
Public donations paid for the window itself, this officially opened by
King
George VI
George VI on 10 July 1947. Although not actually an 'official'
memorial to the
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain in the sense that government paid
for it, the window and chapel have since been viewed as such. During
the late 1950s and 1960, various proposals were advanced for a
national monument to the Battle of Britain, this also the focus of
several letters in The Times. In 1960 the Conservative government
decided against a further monument, taking the view that the credit
should be shared more broadly than
Fighter
Fighter Command alone, and there
was little public appetite for one. All subsequent memorials are the
result of private subscription and initiative, as discussed
below.[293]
There are numerous memorials to the battle. The most important ones
are the
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Monument in
London
London and the Battle of Britain
Memorial at Capel-le-Ferne in Kent.
Westminster Abbey
Westminster Abbey and St James's
Church, Paddington both have memorial windows to the battle, replacing
windows that were destroyed during the campaign. There is also a
memorial at the former
Croydon
Croydon Airport, one of the RAF bases during
the battle, and a memorial to the pilots at
Armadale Castle
Armadale Castle on the
Isle of
Skye
Skye in Scotland, which is topped by a raven sculpture.
There are also two museums to the battle: one at Hawkinge in
Kent
Kent and
one at
Stanmore
Stanmore in London, at the former RAF Bentley Priory.[294]
In 2015 the RAF created an online '
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain 75th Anniversary
Commemorative Mosaic' composed of pictures of "the few" – the pilots
and aircrew who fought in the battle – and "the many" – 'the often
unsung others whose contribution during the
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain was also
vital to the RAF's victory in the skies above Britain', submitted by
participants and their families.[295]
Memorials to the Battle of Britain
Victoria Embankment, London
Capel-le-Ferne, Kent
Armadale Castle
Westminster Abbey
St James's Church, Paddington
Croydon
Croydon Airport
Monument of Polish Pilots, Northolt
In popular culture[edit]
Media adaptations[edit]
The battle was the subject of the 1969 film Battle of Britain. The
cast included
Laurence Olivier
Laurence Olivier as
Hugh Dowding
Hugh Dowding and
Trevor Howard
Trevor Howard as
Keith Park.[296] It also starred Michael Caine, Christopher Plummer
and Robert Shaw as Squadron Leaders.[296] Former participants of the
battle served as technical advisors including Douglas Bader, Adolf
Galland and Hugh Dowding. An Italian film around the same time
entitled Eagles Over
London
London (1969) also featured the Battle of
Britain. The 1988 ITV mini-series Piece of Cake, an aerial drama about
a fictional Second World War RAF fighter squadron in 1940, features
the battle. The Czech film
Dark Blue World
Dark Blue World (2001) also featured the
battle, focusing on the Czech pilots who fought in the battle. A
fictional version of the battle is shown in the 2001 movie, Pearl
Harbor, in which the battle is depicted as still going on into
1941.[citation needed]
It has also been the subject of many documentaries, including the 1941
Allied propaganda film
Allied propaganda film Churchill's Island, winner of the first Academy
Award for Documentary Short Subject.[297][298] There was also the 1943
The Battle of Britain in Frank Capra's
Why We Fight
Why We Fight series. It was
included in an episode of 2004 BBC television documentary series
Battlefield Britain. In 2010, actor
Julian Glover
Julian Glover played a
101-year-old Polish veteran RAF pilot in the short film Battle for
Britain.[299]
In books[edit]
The Few, a novel by Alex Kershaw, tells the stories of the men who
flew in the Battle of Britain. As of 2003[update], a Hollywood film
similarly named
The Few
The Few was in preparation for release in 2008, based
on the story of real-life US pilot Billy Fiske, who ignored his
country's neutrality rules and volunteered for the RAF. A Variety
magazine outline of the film's historical content[300] was said in The
Independent to have been described by Bill Bond, who conceived the
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Monument in London, as "Totally wrong. The whole
bloody lot."[301] The project was later cancelled.
Miscellaneous[edit]
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain (video game), a 1987 video game
Their Finest Hour: The Battle of Britain, a 1989 video game
Combat Flight Simulator WWII Europe Series, a 1998 combat flight
simulator
Rowan's Battle of Britain, a 2000 video game
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain II: Wings of Victory, a 2005 video game
Blazing Angels: Squadrons of WWII, a 2006 video game
IL-2 Sturmovik: Cliffs of Dover, a 2011 combat flight simulator
See also[edit]
World War II
World War II portal
Air warfare of World War II Battle information
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain RAF squadrons
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain RAF airfields
List of RAF aircrew in the Battle of Britain
Non-British personnel in the RAF during the Battle of Britain
List of military aircraft operational during World War II
Operation Banquet
Operation Lucid
Battle in contemporary history
The Darkest Hour The Few Coventry Blitz Polish Air Forces in France and Great Britain Evacuations of civilians in Britain during World War II Air Transport Auxiliary
Post-war memorials
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Memorial Flight
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Memorial, Capel-le-Ferne
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Monument in London
Kent
Kent
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Museum
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Class steam locomotives of the Southern Railway
Polish War Memorial
Notes[edit]
^ Stacey, p.256: "Even as Britain braced itself to meet the attack of
the Luftwaffe, the nice legalities of Commonwealth cooperation had to
be observed. But the R.C.A.F., like the Canadian Army, was determined
that there should be no possibility of these formalities conferring
any advantage on the enemy. To avoid misunderstanding, delay and
perhaps embarrassment, and doubtless to emphasize the point that No. 1
Squadron was, after all, a Canadian unit, Air Commodore Walsh early
brought the necessity of conforming to the Visiting Forces Acts to the
attention of the Air Officer Commanding No. 11 Group R.A.F., under
whom the squadron would fight..."
^ The Polish, Czech and most other national contingents were, at this
time, incorporated into the RAF itself: the Polish Air Force, for
example, was not given sovereignty until June 1944.[1] Although under
RAF operational control, RCAF pilots in the BoB were technically
flying for the RCAF
^ The British date the battle from 10 July to 31 October 1940, which
represented the most intense period of daylight bombing.[2] German
historians usually place the beginning of the battle in May 1940 and
end it mid-August 1941, with the withdrawal of the bomber units in
preparation for Operation Barbarossa, the campaign against the Soviet
Union, which began on 22 June 1941.[2]
^ For example: Terraine states that the outcome was "decisive";
quoting
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe General Werner Kreipe, who described it as a
"strategic (Luftwaffe) failure" and "turning point in the Second World
War". It also states the "German Air Force was bled almost to death,
and suffered losses that could never be made good throughout the
course of the war". Quoting Dr (Karl) Klee "The invasion and
subjugation of Britain was made to depend on that battle, and its
outcome therefore materially influenced the further course and fate of
the war as a whole".[4]
Other references that can be consulted include::Shulman 2004, p.
63.:Bungay 2000, p. 368.:Hough and Richards 2007, p. XV.:Overy 2001,
p. 267.:Deighton 1980, p. 213.:Keegan 1997, p. 81.:Buell 2002, p.
83.:Terraine 1985, p. 181.
^ 754 single-seat fighters, 149 two-seat fighters, 560 bombers and 500
coastal aircraft. The RAF fighter strength given is for 0900 1 July
1940, while bomber strength is for 11 July 1940.[6]
^ Figures taken from Quartermaster General 6th Battalion returns on 10
August 1940. According to these, the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe deployed 3,358 aircraft
against Britain, of which 2,550 were serviceable. The force was made
up by 934 single-seat fighters, 289 two-seat fighters, 1,482 medium
bombers, 327 dive-bombers, 195 reconnaissance and 93 coastal aircraft,
including unserviceable aircraft. The number of serviceable aircraft
amounted to 805 single-seat fighters, 224 two-seat fighters, 998
medium bombers, 261 dive-bombers, 151 reconnaissance and 80 coastal
aircraft.[7]
^ The
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe possessed 4,074 aircraft, but not all of these were
deployed against Britain. The force was made up of 1,107 single-seat
fighters, 357 two-seat fighters, 1,380 medium bombers, 428
dive-bombers, 569 reconnaissance and 233 coastal aircraft, including
unserviceable aircraft. The
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe air strength given is from the
Quartermaster General 6th Battalion numbers for 29 June 1940.[6]
^ 1,220 fighters (per type: 753 Hurricane, 467 Spitfire)[13] 376
bombers, 148 aircraft (RAF Coastal Command)[8]
^ The strategic bombing commenced after the Germans bombed
London
London on
14 September 1940, followed by the RAF bombing of Berlin and of German
air force bases in France.
Adolf Hitler
Adolf Hitler withdrew his directive not to
bomb population centres and ordered attacks on British cities.[21]
^ Bf 109E-3 and E-4s had this armament, while the E-1, which was still
used in large numbers, was armed with four 7.92mm machine guns.
^ The inboard position of the upper wing roundels on the Spitfire
strongly suggests this was a repainted captured Spitfire or a
photo-reconnaissance model, at least one of which was captured in
France.
^ The pilots occupying these administrative positions included such
officers as Dowding, Park and Leigh-Mallory and the numbers actually
fit to serve in front line fighter squadrons are open to question.
^ Polish units in the composition of the RAF taking part in the Battle
of Britain In the Battle of Britain, first in composition, and then
alongside the RAF fought four Polish squadrons: two bomber (300 and
301), 2 Hunting (302 and 303) and 81 Polish pilots in British
squadrons, a total of 144 Polish pilots (killed 29 ), representing 5%
of all the pilots of the RAF taking part in the battle. Poles shot
down about 170 German aircraft, damaged 36, representing about 12% of
the losses of the Luftwaffe. Squadron 303 was the best unit air,
taking part in the
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain – reported shot down 126
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe planes.
^ This was the turning radius of a Bf 109, meaning that both aircraft,
if necessary, could turn together at high speed.[118]
^ This formation was developed based on principles formulated by the
First World War ace
Oswald Boelcke
Oswald Boelcke in 1916. In 1934 the Finnish Air
Force adopted similar formations, called partio (patrol; two aircraft)
and parvi (two patrols; four aircraft),[135] for similar reasons,
though Luftwaffe' pilots during the
Spanish Civil War
Spanish Civil War (led by Günther
Lützow and Werner Mölders, among others) are generally given credit.
^ This account is from Warner 2005, p. 253 Another source, Ramsay
1989, p. 555, lists no aircrew casualties and three 109s in total
destroyed or damaged.
^ "Satellite" airfields were mostly fully equipped but did not have
the sector control room which allowed "Sector" airfields such as
Biggin Hill
Biggin Hill to monitor and control RAF fighter formations. RAF units
from Sector airfields often flew into a satellite airfield for
operations during the day, returning to their home airfield in the
evenings.
^ Irving 1974, pp. 118–119: Irving's sources were General Franz
Halder and the OKW War Diary for 14 September 1940. Keitel's notes, ND
803-PS, record the same.
^ Bungay refers to the 14 September meeting with Milch and Jeschonnek.
Hitler wanted to keep up the "moral" pressure on the British
Government, in the hope it would crack. Bungay indicates that Hitler
had changed his mind from the day before, refusing to call off the
invasion for the time being.[244]
^ Jeffrey Quill wrote of his combat experience whilst flying with No.
65 Squadron: Nearly all our engagements with Me 109s took place at
around 20,000 – 25,000 ft. The Spitfire had the edge over them in
speed and climb, and particularly in turning circle. (...) One
engagement with several Me 109s at about 25,000 ft over the Channel
sticks in my memory...I was now convinced that the Spitfire Mk I could
readily out-turn the 109, certainly in the 20,000 ft region and
probably at all heights.[249]
^ Bf 109 leaking valves, supercharger faults/failure.[250]
^ This proposal has since been confused, or conflated, with a possible
flight by HMG in exile.
^ This is sometimes erroneously believed to refer to the entire RAF.
^ The exact percentage was 28. The
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe deployed 5,638 aircraft
for the campaign. 1,428 were destroyed and a further 488 were damaged,
but were repairable.[286]
References[edit]
^ Peszke 1980, p. 134
^ a b Foreman 1989, p. 8
^ Hough, Ronald (26 July 2010). "The Battle of Britain". Pen &
Sword. Retrieved 25 March 2017.
^ Terraine 1985, p. 219
^ Haining 2005, p. 68
^ a b c Bungay 2000, p. 107
^ Wood and Dempster 2003, p. 318.
^ a b c d Bungay 2000, p. 368
^ Ramsay 1989, pp. 251–297
^ a b "
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain RAF and FAA Roll of Honour." RAF.. Retrieved:
14 July 2008.
^ 544 aircrew (RAF
Fighter
Fighter Command), 718 (RAF
Bomber
Bomber Command), 280
(RAF Coastal Command) killed[8][9][10]
^ Wood and Dempster 2003, p. 309.
^ Overy 2001, p. 161
^ a b c Hans Ring, "Die Luftschlacht über
England
England 1940", Luftfahrt
international Ausgabe 12, 1980 p.580
^ 812 fighters (per type: 569 Bf 109, 243 Bf 110)
822 bombers (per type: 65 Ju 87, 271 Ju 88, 184 Do 17, 223 He 111, 29
He 59, 24 He 159, 34 Others)
343 non combat (per type: 76 Bf 109, 29 Bf 110, 25 Ju 87, 54 Ju 88, 31
Do 17, 66 He 111, 7 He 59, 7 He 159, 48 Others)[14]
^ Goodenough 1982, p. 22
^ "92 Squadron – Geoffrey Wellum."
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Memorial Flight
via raf.mod.uk.. Retrieved: 17 November 2010, archived 2 March 2009.
^ "Introduction to the Phases of the Battle – History of the Battle
of Britain – Exhibitions & Displays – Research". RAF Museum.
Retrieved 5 November 2015.
^ Overy 2013, pp. 73–74.
^ a b Bungay 2000, pp. 31–33.
^ Bungay 2000, pp. 305–306
^ Cite error: The named reference Bungay, Stephen 2000 was invoked but
never defined (see the help page).
^ a b Bungay 2000, p. 388
^ a b Stacey 1955, p.18
^ a b Murray 2002, The Luftwaffe: Origins and Preparation
^ Bishop 2010, pp. 14–18.
^ Bishop 2010, pp. 18, 24–26.
^ Murray 2002, pp. 6–7.
^ Murray 2002, pp. 7–9.
^ Bungay 2000, pp. 36–39.
^ Overy 2013, pp. 42–43.
^ Bishop 2010, pp. 18–24.
^ Deighton 1996, pp. 12–13.
^ Bishop 2010, p. 26.
^ Bungay 2000, pp. 39–40.
^ Deighton 1996, pp. 69–73
^ a b "A Short History of the Royal Air Force," pp. 99–100. RAF..
Retrieved: 10 July 2011.
^ Ray 2003, p. 62
^ Bungay 2000, p. 9
^ Smith 1942, p. 96
^ Bungay 2000, p. 11
^ "Their Finest Hour." The Churchill Centre. Retrieved: 17 January
2012.
^ "
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain – finest hour speech" on Youtube. Retrieved: 1
February 2015.
^ a b Bungay 2000, pp. 27–31.
^ Shirer 1964, pp. 589–593.
^ "Hitler and Poland". Holocaust Educational Resource. 23 May 1939.
Retrieved 20 December 2015.
^ Shirer 1964, pp. 712–713.
^ "Directive No. 1 for the Conduct of the War". Berlin. 31 August
1939. Retrieved 20 December 2015.
^ Murray 2002, pp. 32–33, 35, Directive No. 6 for the Conduct
of the War, Berlin, 9 October 1939
^ a b Overy 2013, p. 68, Directive No. 9 – Instructions For
Warfare Against The Economy Of The Enemy, Berlin, 29 November 1939.
^ a b Murray 2002, p. 33
^ a b Magenheimer 2015, p. 24, Directive No. 13, Headquarters, 24
May 1940
^ Bungay 2000, pp. 31–33, 122.
^ a b c d Murray 2002, pp. 44–45
^ "Directive No. 16 – On preparations for a landing operation
against England". Führer Headquarters. 16 July 1940. Retrieved 11
February 2016.
^ Bungay 2000, pp. 110–114.
^ a b Overy 2013, p. 72.
^ a b Bungay 2000, pp. 31–33
Directive No. 17 – For the conduct of air and sea warfare against
England, Führer Headquarters, 1 August 1940.
^ a b Overy 2001, pp. 87–89.
^ a b Overy 2013, p. 90.
^ Bungay 2000, pp. 9–13, 33.
^ Hitler 1940, My Last Appeal to Great Britain
^ Bishop 2010, pp. 114–115.
^ a b Overy 2013, pp. 68–69.
^ Bungay 2000, p. 13.
^ Overy 2001, p. 109.
^ Bungay 2000, p. 32.
^ Bungay 2000, p. ii.
^ Bungay 2000, pp. 31, 110, 122.
^ Bishop 2010, pp. 106–107.
^ Bishop 2010, pp. 70–71.
^ Deighton 1996, p. 51.
^ Bungay 2000, p. 111.
^ Bishop 2010, pp. 107–108.
^ Bungay 2000, pp. 113–114.
^ Overy 2013, pp. 42–43, 60–65.
^ Heinz Magenheimer 2015, p. 20.
^ Overy 2013, pp. 66–67, 70, 75, 690.
^ Bungay 2000, p. 114.
^ Crosby 2002, p. 84
^ "Report on Comparative Trials of Hurricane versus Messerschmitt
109." wwiiaircraftperformance.org. Retrieved: 19 March 2015.
^ Lloyd, p.139
^ "Calibration of Hurricane L1717 Merlin II Engine."
wwiiaircraftperformance.org. Retrieved: 19 March 2015.
^ "RAE Chart of Spitfire I, Merlin III." wwiiaircraftperformance.org.
Retrieved: 19 March 2015.
^ Sarkar 2011, pp. 66–67
^ McKinstry 2010, p. 86
^ Jones 1970, p. 187
^ Ramsay 1989, pp. 415, 516, 526, 796
^ Harvey-Bailey 1985, p. 135.
^ Holmes 1998, pp. 18–19
^ RAF yearbook 1978 p61
^ Bungay 2000, pp. 265–266
^ Price 2002, p. 78
^ Feist 1993, p. 29
^ Green 1980, p. 73
^ Weal 1999, pp. 47–48
^ Weal 1999, p. 49
^ a b Bungay 2000, pp. 257–258
^ Weal 1999, pp. 42–51
^ Green 1962, p. 33
^ Bungay 2000, pp. 84, 178, 269–273
^ Ansell 2005, pp. 712–714
^ a b Price 1980, pp. 6–10
^ Wood and Dempster 2003, p. 228.
^ Smith 2002, p. 51
^ Ward 2004, p. 107
^ Wright 1968, p. 31
^ "Fairey Battle." Archived 7 July 2012 at Archive.is
airlandseaweapons.devhub.com, 16 August 2009. Retrieved: 3 November
2010.
^ Richards 1953, pp. 186–187
^ "But night after night. the Battles and the Blenheims, the
Wellingtons, the Whitleys and the Hampdens went forth."[109]
^ Terraine 1985, pp. 44–45
^ Bungay 2000, p. 86
^ Terraine 1985, p. 44
^ Bishop 1968, pp. 85–87
^ a b c Bungay 2000, p. 370
^ a b Ponting 1991, p. 130
^ a b c Bungay 2000, p. 260
^ a b c Bungay 2000, p. 259
^ Ramsay 1989, pp. 757–790
^ "The Airmen of the Battle of Britain" bbm.org.uk. Retrieved: 29
January 2017.
^ Owen, R.E, New Zealanders with the Royal Air Force. Wellington, New
Zealand: Government Printer, 1953, Volume 1, Chapter 4, p. 71.
^ Overy 2013, pp. 67–68, 71, 80, 92.
^ Overy 2001, pp. 61–62, 65–66.
^ Bungay 2000, p. 122.
^ Bishop 2010, pp. 82–83.
^ a b Bungay 2000, pp. 123–125.
^ a b Overy 2001, pp. 56–57, 61–62.
^ a b Overy 2013, pp. 82–83.
^ Overy 2013, p. 85.
^ Overy 2001, pp. 78–89.
^ a b Bungay 2000, p. 119
^ a b Bungay 2000, p. 122
^ Stedman, Robert F. Jagdflieger:
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe
Fighter
Fighter Pilot 1939–45.
p. 58.
^ a b Price 1980, pp. 12–13
^ Nikunen, Heikki. ""The Finnish
Fighter
Fighter Tactics and Training Before
and During the WW II." Archived 7 June 2011 at the Wayback Machine.
FI: Saunalahti, January 2006. Retrieved: 26 April 2008.
^ Bungay 2000, pp. 163–164
^ Weal 1999, p. 50
^ Bungay 2000, pp. 232–233
^ Bungay 2000, p. 305
^ Wood and Dempster 2003, p. 216.
^ Holmes 2007, p. 69
^ Price 1980, pp. 13–15
^ a b c Bungay 2000, p. 68
^ Bungay 2000, pp. 69–70
^ Bungay 2000, p. 186
^ Bungay 2000, pp. 68–69
^ "Lt Col Earle Lund, USAF, p. 13."[permanent dead link] ProFTPd.
Retrieved: 13 June 2008.
^ a b Bungay 2000, p. 188
^ a b Abteilung V Intelligence Appreciation of the RAF (see "Appendix
4") Archived 27 August 2008 at the Wayback Machine.. ProFTPd..
Retrieved: 13 June 2008.
^ Bungay 2000, p. 193
^ a b Allen 1974[page needed]
^ Bungay 2000, p. 342
^ Orange 2001, p. 98
^ a b c Richards 1953, p. 159
^ a b Deere 1974, p. 89
^ Ramsay 1987, p. 113
^ Churchill 1949, p. 332
^ Deere 1974, pp. 95–96
^ Ramsay 1989, pp. 602, 680
^ Galland 2005, p. 33
^ Korda 2010, p. 18
^ Price 1980, p. 26
^ Overy 2013, pp. 79–80.
^ Winterbotham 1975, p. 13
^ Winterbotham 1975, pp. 61–63
^ Winterbotham 1975, pp. 68–69
^ Winterbotham 1975, p. 65
^ Ramsay 1989, p. 5
^ "RAF History: Air/Sea Search and Rescue – 60th Anniversary." UK:
RAF. Retrieved: 24 May 2008.
^ Bungay 2000, p. 249
^ Price 1996, p. 26
^ Bungay 2000, p. 250
^ Holmes 2007, p. 61
^ Price 1980, pp. 28–30
^ Price 1996, p. 55
^ a b Orange 2001, pp. 96, 100
^ Bungay 2000, pp. 276–277, 309–310, 313–314, 320–321,
329–330, 331
^ Bungay 2000, p. 356
^ Bungay 2000, p. 359
^ Bungay 2000, p. 354
^ Bungay 2000, p. 90
^ a b Overy 2013, pp. 241–245.
^ a b c Halpenny 1984, pp. 8–9
^ a b c Taylor and Mayer 1974, p. 74.
^ Ramsay 1989, p. 552
^ Warner 2005, p. 253
^ Warner 2005, pp. 255, 266
^ Warner 2005
^ Bungay 2000, p. 92
^ Bungay 2000, p. 237
^ "Speech of 20 August 1940." Archived 16 December 2008 at the Wayback
Machine. Winston Churchill. Retrieved: 16 April 2008.
^ Warner 2005, p. 251
^ Campion, Garry (2015). The Battle of Britain, 1945–1965: The Air
Ministry and
The Few
The Few (first ed.). Palgrave Macmillan.
pp. 65–88. ISBN 978-0230284548.
^ Campion, Garry (2015). The Battle of Britain, 1945–1965: The Air
Ministry and
The Few
The Few (first ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
pp. 91–161. ISBN 978-0230284548.
^ Overy 2001, pp. 61–62.
^ "Introduction to the Phases of the Battle – History of the Battle
of Britain – Exhibitions & Displays – Research". RAF Museum.
Retrieved 28 March 2016.
^ Overy 2001, pp. 63–65.
^ Overy 2001, pp. 47–49, 61.
^ Bishop 2010, p. 54.
^ Overy 2013, pp. 71–72.
^ Overy 2001, p. 66.
^ Bishop 2010, pp. 80–81.
^ Overy 2013, p. 80.
^ Deighton 1980, pp. 154–183
^ Overy 2013, pp. 82–83, 85.
^ a b c Bungay 2000, pp. 203–205
^ "Document 32.
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Historical Society. Retrieved: 19
March 2015.
^ Price 1980, p. 179
^ Deighton 1996, p. 182
^ Korda 2010, pp. 197–198
^ Overy 2013, pp. 81–82.
^ Overy 2013, p. 82.
^ a b c Putland, Alan L. "19 August – 24 August 1940." Battle of
Britain Historical Society. Retrieved: 12 August 2009.
^ Zaloga and Hook 1982, p. 15.
^ Deighton 1996, pp. 188, 275
^ Holland 2011, pp. 760. 657–658.
^ Ingersoll 1940, pp. 159–169
^ Holland 2011, p. 658
^ the PRO, AIR 19/60.
^ a b Bungay 2000, pp. 368–369
^ a b Dye 2000, pp. 1, 31–40
^ a b Dye, Air Vice Marshal Peter. Aeroplane, Issue July 2010, p. 33.
^ Dye 2000, p. 33
^ Dye 2000, pp. 33, 37
^ Overy 1980, pp. 32–33
^ Overy 2010, p. 38
^ Wood and Dempster 2003, pp. 212–213.
^ Richards 1953, pp. 176, 190–193
^ Korda 2010, p. 198
^ a b c Overy 2013, pp. 84–85.
^ Wood and Dempster 2003, p. 193.
^ Bungay 2000, p. 306
^ Irving 1974, p. 117 Note: OKW War diary, 6–9 September 1940.
^ Hough and Richards 2007, p. 245.
^ Overy 2013, p. 83.
^ Putland, Alan L. "7 September 1940."
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Historical
Society. Retrieved: 12 August 2009.
^ Putland, Alan L. "7 September 1940 – The Aftermath." Battle of
Britain Historical Society. Retrieved: 12 August 2009.
^ Overy 2013, pp. 83, 87.
^ Putland, Alan L. "8 September – 9 September 1940." Battle of
Britain Historical Society. Retrieved: 12 August 2009.
^ Wagner and Nowarra 1971, p. 229.
^ Wagner and Nowarra 1971, p. 235.
^ Irving 1974, p. 117
^ Murray 1983, p. 52.
^ Bungay 2000, p. 317
^ Overy 2001, p. 88.
^ a b Overy 2013, p. 91.
^ Overy 2013, p. 71.
^ Overy 2001, pp. 78–89, 95–96.
^ "Image: 65-quill-12aug40.jpg, (1000 × 1590 px)".
spitfireperformance.com. Retrieved 28 November 2017.
^
Kesselring as cited in A. van Ishoven,
Messerschmitt Bf 109
Messerschmitt Bf 109 at War,
(Ian Allan, Shepperton, 1977), p. 107.
^ Steinhilper, op. cit., p.280,282, 295–297.
^ Overy 2001, pp. 95–97.
^ Green, Ron and Mark Harrison. "Forgotten frontline exhibition tells
how
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe fought with soldiers on
Kent
Kent marshes."
Kent
Kent Online, 30
September 2009. Retrieved: 21 August 2010.
^ Overy 2013, pp. 90–93.
^ "
George VI
George VI and Elizabeth during the war years." UK: Royal
government. Retrieved: 30 June 2008.
^ Ramsay 1988, p. 90
^ Churchill 1949, p. 334
^ Dye 2000, p. 35
^ a b Murray 2002, p. 53
^ Murray 2002, p. 56
^ a b Murray 2002, p. 55
^ Bungay 2000, p. 371
^ Hough and Richards 2007, p. 229.
^ Murray 2002, p. 50
^ Wood and Dempster 2003, p. 314.
^ a b Wood and Dempster 2003, p. 306.
^ Wood and Dempster 2003, p. 313.
^ a b Murray 2002, p. 52
^ Overy 2001, p. 125
^ Overy 2001, p. 126
^ Bungay 2000, p. 298
^ Overy 2001, p. 97
^ Campion, Garry (2010). The Good Fight:
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Propaganda
and
The Few
The Few (first ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
ISBN 978-0230279964.
^ Campion, Garry (2015). The Battle of Britain, 1945–1965: The Air
Ministry and The Few. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
pp. 13–31. ISBN 978-0230284548.
^ Campion, Garry (2010). The Good Fight:
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Propaganda
and The Few. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 104–115.
ISBN 978-0230279964.
^ Campion, Garry (2015). The Battle of Britain, 1945–1965: The Air
Ministry and The Few. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
pp. 180–186. ISBN 978-0230284548.
^ Bungay 2000, pp. 370–373
^ Bungay 2000, pp. 398–399
^ Putland, Alan L. "
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain 1940: Britain Prepares for War."
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Historical Society. Retrieved: 28 June 2010.
^ Deighton 1996, introduction by A.J.P. Taylor, pp. 12–17.
^ Deighton 1996, pp. 172, 285
^ Ingersoll 1940, pp. 4–5
^ Deighton 1996, pp. 266–268
^ Bungay 2000, pp. 394–396
^ Evans, Richard J. "Immoral Rearmament". The New York Review of
Books, No. 20, 20 December 2007.
^ Hooton Vol 2. 2007, pp. 48–49.
^ Wood and Dempster 2003, p. 80.
^ Price 1980, pp. 182–183
^ Speech to the House of Commons on 20 August 1940.
^ "
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Day". BBC. Retrieved: 18 March 2015.
^ "
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain 70th Anniversary" Archived 15 November 2013 at
the Wayback Machine.. The Royal British Legion. Retrieved: 18 March
2015.
^ "Tudor Rose Patchwork". [permanent dead link]
^ Campion, Garry (2015). The Battle of Britain, 1945–1965: The Air
Ministry and
The Few
The Few (first ed.). Palgrave Macmillan.
pp. 186–194. ISBN 978-0230284548.
^ "
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Museum opened by Prince Charles". BBC News. 12
September 2013. Retrieved 8 August 2015.
^
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain 75th Anniversary Commemorative Mosaic, Royal Air
Force
^ a b Battle of Britain:
Special
Special Edition DVD (1969) BBC. Retrieved: 22
December 2011
^ "Churchill's Island." Archived 21 February 2009 at the Wayback
Machine. NFB.ca, National Film Board of Canada. Retrieved: 17 February
2009.
^ Campion, Garry (2015). The Battle of Britain, 1945–1965: The Air
Ministry and The Few. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
pp. 103–104. ISBN 978-0230284548.
^ "Dreaming Spires." The Economist via economist.com, 16 September
2010. Retrieved: 29 September 2010.
^ Fleming, Michael (SEPTEMBER 9, 2003). "New flight plan for Cruise".
VARIETY. Variety Media. Retrieved 2 April 2018. Check date
values in: date= (help)
^ Moreton, Cole. "Hollywood updates history of Battle of Britain: Tom
Cruise won it all on his own." Archived 18 December 2007 at the
Wayback Machine. The Independent, 11 April 2004. Retrieved: 28
December 2007.
Bibliography[edit] General[edit]
Allen, Hubert Raymond "Dizzy", Wing Commander, RAF. Who Won the Battle
of Britain? London: Arthur Barker, 1974. ISBN 0-213-16489-2.
Bishop, Edward. Their Finest Hour:
The Battle of Britain 1940. London:
Ballantine Books, 1968.
Bishop, Patrick (2010). Battle of Britain : a day-by-day
chronicle, 10 July 1940 to 31 October 1940. London: Quercus.
ISBN 978-1-84916-224-1.
Buckley, John. Air Power in the Age of Total War. London: UCL Press,
1999. ISBN 1-85728-589-1.
Buell, Thomas. The Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean. New
York: Square One Publishers, 2002. ISBN 978-0-7570-0160-4.
Bungay, Stephen (2000). The Most Dangerous Enemy : A History of
the Battle of Britain. London: Aurum Press.
ISBN 1-85410-721-6. (hardcover), 2002,
ISBN 1-85410-801-8 (paperback).
Collier, Basil. The Defence of the
United Kingdom
United Kingdom (1962, Official
history)
Collier, Basil.
The Battle of Britain (1962, Batsford's British
Battles series)
Collier, Richard. Eagle Day: The Battle of Britain, 6 August – 15
September 1940. London: Pan Books, 1968.
Churchill, Winston S (1949), The Second World War – Their Finest
Hour (Volume 2), London: Cassell
Churchill, Winston S. The Second World War – The Grand Alliance
(Volume 3). Bantam Books, 1962.
Corum, James. The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War,
1918–1940. Lawrence, Kansas: Kansas University Press, 1997.
ISBN 0-7006-0836-2.
Crosby, Francis. A Handbook of
Fighter
Fighter Aircraft. London: Hermes House,
2002. ISBN 978-1-8430-9444-9.
Deighton, Len (1996). Fighter: The True Story of the Battle of
Britain. London: Pimlico. ISBN 0-7126-7423-3. (Originally
published: London: Jonathan Cape, 1977.) ISBN 0-7126-7423-3.
Deighton, Len. Battle of Britain. London: Cape, 1980.
ISBN 0-224-01826-4.
de Zeng, Henry L., Doug G. Stankey and Eddie J. Creek.
Bomber
Bomber Units of
the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe 1933–1945: A Reference Source, Volume 1. Hersham,
Surrey, UK: Ian Allen Publishing, 2007. ISBN 978-1-85780-279-5.
Dönitz, Karl. Ten years and Twenty Days. New York: Da Capo Press,
First Edition, 1997. ISBN 0-306-80764-5.
Dye, Air Commodore Peter J. (Winter 2000), "Logistics and the Battle
of Britain", Air Force Journal of Logistics, Vol 4 (No. 24), archived
from the original on 26 September 2010
Ellis, John. Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second
World War. London: Andre Deutsch, 1990. ISBN 0-8264-8031-4.
Evans, Michael. "Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed
by so many to ... the Navy." The Times, 24 August 2006.
Retrieved: 3 March 2007.
Goodenough, Simon. War Maps: World War II, From September 1939 to
August 1945, Air, Sea, and Land, Battle by Battle. New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1982, ISBN 978-0-3128-5584-0.
Halpenny, Bruce Barrymore. Action Station 4: Military Airfields of
Yorkshire. Cambridge, UK: Patrick Stevens, 1984.
ISBN 0-85059-532-0.
Harding, Thomas. "
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain was won at sea." The Telegraph, 25
August 2006. Retrieved: 25 August 2006.
Holland, James. The Battle of Britain. London: Bantam, 2011.
ISBN 978-0-593-05913-5.
Hooton, E.R.
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe at War:
Blitzkrieg
Blitzkrieg in the West, Vol. 2. London:
Chevron/Ian Allen, 2007. ISBN 978-1-85780-272-6.
Hough, Richard and Denis Richards. The Battle of Britain: The Greatest
Air Battle of World War II. New York: W.W. Norton & Co Inc, 2007.
ISBN 978-0-393-02766-2.
Ingersoll, Ralph (1940), Report on England, November 1940, New York:
Simon & Schuster
Irving, David (1974), The Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe: The Life of
Field Marshal Erhard Milch, Dorney, Windsor, UK: Focal Point
Publications, ISBN 978-0-297-76532-5
Keegan, John. The Second World War London: Pimlico, 1997.
ISBN 978-0-7126-7348-8.
Kieser, Egbert. Operation Sea Lion; The German Plan to Invade Britain
1940. London: Cassel Military Paperbacks, 1999.
ISBN 0-304-35208-X.
Kieser, Egbert. Unternehmen Seelöwe: Die geplante Invasion in England
1940 (in German). Berlin: Becthle, 2000. ISBN 3-7628-0457-5.
Korda, Michael (2010), With Wings Like Eagles: The Untold Story of the
Battle of Britain, New York: Harper Perennial,
ISBN 978-0-06-112536-2
Macksey, Kenneth. Invasion: The German Invasion of England, July 1940.
London: Greenhill Books, 1990. ISBN 0-85368-324-7.
Magenheimer, Heinz (10 September 2015). Hitler's War: Germany's Key
Strategic Decisions 1940–45. Orion.
ISBN 978-1-4746-0275-4.
Mason, Francis K.Battle Over Britain: A History of the German Air
Assaults on Great Britain, 1917–18 and July–December 1940, and the
Development of Air Defences Between the World Wars. New York:
Doubleday, 1969. ISBN 978-0-901928-00-9.
Murray, Williamson (2002). Strategy for defeat : the Luftwaffe,
1933–1945. Honolulu, Hawaii: University Press of the Pacific.
ISBN 0-89875-797-5.
Overy, Richard J. (2001). The Battle of Britain: The Myth and the
Reality. New York: W.W. Norton. ISBN 0-393-02008-8.
(hardcover, ISBN 0-393-32297-1 paperback, 2002)
Overy, Richard J. (2013). The Bombing War : Europe 1939–1945.
London
London & New York: Allen Lane. ISBN 978-0-7139-9561-9.
Owen, R.E, New Zealanders with the
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force Government Printer,
Wellington,
New Zealand
New Zealand 1953.
Peszke, Michael Alfred. "A Synopsis of Polish-Allied Military
Agreements During World War Two." The Journal of Military History,
Volume 44, No. 3, October 1980, pp. 128–134.
Ponting, Clive. 1940: Myth and Reality. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1991.
ISBN 978-1-56663-036-8.
Pope, Stephan. "Across the Ether: Part One". Aeroplane, Vol. 23, No.
5, Issue No. 265, May 1995.
Price, Alfred (1980), The Hardest Day: 18 August 1940, New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, ISBN 0-684-16503-1
Raeder, Erich. Erich Rader, Grand Admiral. New York: Da Capo Press;
United States
United States Naval Institute, 2001. ISBN 0-306-80962-1.
Ramsay, Winston, ed. (1987),
The Blitz
The Blitz Then and Now: Volume 1, London:
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Prints International, ISBN 0-900913-45-2
Ramsay, Winston, ed. (1988),
The Blitz
The Blitz Then and Now: Volume 2, London:
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Prints International, ISBN 0-900913-54-1
Ramsay, Winston, ed. (1989),
The Battle of Britain Then and Now Mk V,
London:
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Prints International,
ISBN 0-900913-46-0
Richards, Denis.
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force 1939–1945, Vol. I: The Fight at
Odds. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1953.
Robinson, Derek, Invasion, 1940: Did the
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Alone Stop
Hitler? New York: Carroll & Graf, 2005. ISBN 0-7867-1618-5.
Shulman, Milton. Defeat in the West. London: Cassell, 2004 (First
edition 1947). ISBN 0-304-36603-X.
Shirer, William (1964), The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A
History of Nazi Germany, London: Ballantine,
ISBN 978-0-449-21977-5
Smith, Howard K. Last Train from Berlin. New York: Knopf, 1942.
Stacey, C P. (1955) The Canadian Army 1939–1945 An Official
Historical Summary Queen's Printer, Ottawa
Stacey, C P. (1970) Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of
Canada, 1939–1945 Queen's Printer, Ottawa (Downloadable PDF)
Taylor, A. J. P. and S. L. Mayer, eds. A History of World War Two.
London: Octopus Books, 1974. ISBN 0-7064-0399-1.
Terraine, John, The Right of the Line: The
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force in the
European War, 1939–1945. New York: Sceptre, 1985.
ISBN 0-340-41919-9.
Terraine, John, A Time for Courage: The
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force in the
European War, 1939–1945. London: Macmillan, 1985.
ISBN 978-0-02-616970-7.
Wagner, Ray and Heinz Nowarra. German Combat Planes: A Comprehensive
Survey and History of the Development of German Military Aircraft from
1914 to 1945. New York: Doubleday & Company, 1971.
Winterbotham, F. W. (1975), The Ultra Secret, London: Futura
Publications, ISBN 0-86007-268-1
Wood, Derek, and Derek Dempster, The Narrow Margin: The Battle of
Britain and the Rise of Air Power, 1930–1949. London: Pen &
Sword, 2003, First edition 1961. ISBN 978-0-85052-915-9.
Wright, Gordon, The Ordeal of Total War: 1939–1945. New York: Harper
& Row, 1968.
Autobiographies and biographies[edit]
Collier, Basil. Leader of the Few: the Authorised Biography of Air
Chief Marshal Lord Dowding of Bentley Priory. London: Jarrolds, 1957.
Deere, Alan C., Nine Lives. London: Hodder Paperbacks Ltd for Coronet
Books, 1974. ISBN 0-340-01441-5.
Duncan Smith, Group Captain W.G.G., Spitfire into Battle. London: John
Murray, 2002. ISBN 0-7195-5484-5.
Franks, Norman, Wings of Freedom: Twelve
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Pilots.
London: William Kimber, 1980. ISBN 0-7183-0197-8.
Galland, Adolf' The First and the Last: Germany's
Fighter
Fighter Force in
WWII (Fortunes of War) South Miami, Florida: Cerberus Press, 2005.
ISBN 1-84145-020-0.
Halpenny, Bruce, Fight for the Sky: Stories of Wartime
Fighter
Fighter Pilots.
Cambridge, UK: Patrick Stephens, 1986. ISBN 0-85059-749-8.
Halpenny, Bruce,
Fighter
Fighter Pilots in World War II: True Stories of
Frontline Air Combat (paperback). Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword Books
Ltd, 2004. ISBN 1-84415-065-8.
Orange, Vincent, Park: The Biography of Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith
Park. London: Grub Street, 2001. ISBN 1-902304-61-6.
Aircraft[edit]
Ansell, Mark, Boulton Paul Defiant: Technical Details and History of
the Famous British Night Fighter. Redbourn, Herts, UK: Mushroom Model
Publications, 2005. pp. 712–714. ISBN 83-89450-19-4.
de Zeng, Henry L., Doug G. Stankey and Eddie J. Creek, Bomber
Units of the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe 1933–1945: A Reference Source, Volume 2.
Hersham, Surrey, UK: Ian Allen Publishing, 2007.
ISBN 978-1-903223-87-1.
Feist, Uwe, The Fighting Me 109. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1993.
ISBN 1-85409-209-X.
Goss, Chris, Dornier 17: In Focus. Surrey, UK: Red Kite Books, 2005.
ISBN 0-9546201-4-3.
Green, William, Famous Fighters of the Second World War. London:
Macdonald, 1962.
Harvey-Bailey, Alec. Merlin in Perspective: The Combat Years Derby,
UK: Rolls-Royce Heritage Trust, 1995. ISBN 978-1-8729-2206-5.
Holmes, Tony, Hurricane Aces 1939–1940 (Aircraft of the Aces).
Botley, Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 1998. ISBN 1-85532-597-7.
Holmes, Tony, Spitfire vs Bf 109: Battle of Britain. Oxford: Osprey
Publishing, 2007. ISBN 978-1-84603-190-8.
Huntley, Ian D., Fairey Battle, Aviation Guide 1. Bedford, UK: SAM
Publications, 2004. ISBN 0-9533465-9-5.
Jones, Robert C., Camouflage and Markings Number 8: Boulton Paul
Defiant, RAF Northern Europe 1936–45. London: Ducimus Book Limited,
1970.
Lloyd, Sir Ian and Pugh, Peter., Hives and the Merlin.
Cambridge : Icon Books, 2004. ISBN 1840466448.
Mason, Francis K., Hawker Aircraft since 1920. London: Putnam, 1991.
ISBN 0-85177-839-9.
McKinstry, Leo, Hurricane: Victor of the Battle of Britain. London:
John Murray Publishers, 2010. ISBN 1-84854-339-5
Molson, Kenneth M. et al., Canada's National Aviation Museum: Its
History and Collections. Ottawa: National Aviation Museum, 1988.
ISBN 978-0-660-12001-0.
Moyes, Philip, J. R., "The Fairey Battle." Aircraft in Profile, Volume
2 (nos. 25–48). Windsor, Berkshire, UK: Profile Publications, 1971.
ISBN 0-85383-011-8
Parry, Simon W., Intruders over Britain: The Story of the Luftwaffe's
Night Intruder Force, the Fernnachtjager. Washington, DC: Smithsonian
Books, 1989. ISBN 0-904811-07-7.
Price, Alfred (1996), Spitfire Mark I/II Aces 1939–41 (Aircraft of
the Aces 12), London: Osprey Books, ISBN 1-85532-627-2
Price, Alfred (2002), The Spitfire Story: Revised second edition,
Enderby, Leicester, UK: Silverdale Books,
ISBN 1-85605-702-X
Sarkar, Dilip, How the Spitfire Won the Battle of Britain. London:
Amberly, 2011. ISBN 1-84868-868-7.
Scutts, Jerry, Messerschmitt Bf 109: The Operational Record. Sarasota,
Florida: Crestline Publishers, 1996. ISBN 978-0-7603-0262-0.
Ward, John, Hitler's Stuka Squadrons. London: Brown Reference, 2004.
ISBN 0-7603-1991-X.
Warner, G (2005), The
Bristol
Bristol Blenheim: A Complete History (2nd ed.),
London: Crécy Publishing, ISBN 0-85979-101-7
Weal, John (1999),
Messerschmitt Bf 110
Messerschmitt Bf 110 'Zerstōrer' Aces of World War
2, Botley, Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing,
ISBN 1-85532-753-8
Additional references[edit]
Books
Addison, Paul and Jeremy Crang. The Burning Blue: A New History of the
Battle of Britain. London: Pimlico, 2000. ISBN 0-7126-6475-0.
Bergström, Christer. Barbarossa – The Air Battle: July–December
1941. London: Chervron/Ian Allen, 2007. ISBN 978-1-85780-270-2.
Bishop, Patrick.
Fighter
Fighter Boys: The Battle of Britain, 1940. New York:
Viking, 2003 (hardcover, ISBN 0-670-03230-1); Penguin Books,
2004. ISBN 0-14-200466-9. As
Fighter
Fighter Boys: Saving Britain 1940.
London: Harper Perennial, 2004. ISBN 0-00-653204-7.
Brittain, Vera. England's Hour. London: Continuum International
Publishing Group, 2005 (paperback, ISBN 0-8264-8031-4); Obscure
Press (paperback, ISBN 1-84664-834-3).
Campion, Garry. The Good Fight:
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Wartime Propaganda
and The Few. Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010,
First edition 2008. ISBN 978-0-230-27996-4.
Campion, Garry. The Battle of Britain, 1945–1965: The Air Ministry
and the Few: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. ISBN 978-0230284548
Cooper, Matthew. The German Air Force 1933–1945: An Anatomy of
Failure. New York: Jane's Publishing Incorporated, 1981.
ISBN 0-531-03733-9.
Craig, Phil and Tim Clayton. Finest Hour: The Battle of Britain. New
York: Simon & Schuster, 2000. ISBN 0-684-86930-6 (hardcover);
2006, ISBN 0-684-86931-4 (paperback).
Cumming, Anthony J. The
Royal Navy
Royal Navy and The Battle of Britain.
Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2010.
ISBN 978-1-59114-160-0.
Fiedler, Arkady. 303 Squadron: The Legendary
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Fighter
Squadron. Los Angeles: Aquila Polonica, 2010.
ISBN 978-1-60772-004-1.
Fisher, David E. A Summer Bright and Terrible: Winston Churchill, Lord
Dowding,
Radar
Radar and the Impossible Triumph of the Battle of Britain.
Emeryville, CA: Shoemaker & Hoard, 2005. (hardcover,
ISBN 1-59376-047-7); 2006, ISBN 1-59376-116-3 (paperback).
Foreman, John. Battle of Britain: The Forgotten Months, November And
December 1940. Wythenshawe, Lancashire, UK: Crécy Publishing, 1989.
ISBN 1-871187-02-8.
Gaskin, Margaret. Blitz: The Story of 29 December 1940. New York:
Harcourt, 2006. ISBN 0-15-101404-3.
Haining, Peter. The Chianti Raiders: The Extraordinary Story of the
Italian Air Force in the Battle of Britain. London: Robson Books,
2005. ISBN 1-86105-829-2.
Haining, Peter. Where the Eagle Landed: The Mystery of the German
Invasion of Britain, 1940. London: Robson Books, 2004.
ISBN 1-86105-750-4.
Halpenny, Bruce Barrymore. Action Stations: Military Airfields of
Greater
London
London v. 8. Cambridge, UK: Patrick Stephens, 1984.
ISBN 0-85039-885-1.
Harding, Thomas. "It's baloney, say RAF aces". The Telegraph, 24
August 2006. Retrieved: 3 March 2007.
Hough, Richard. The Battle of Britain: The Greatest Air Battle of
World War II. New York: W.W. Norton, 1989. ISBN 0-393-02766-X
(hardcover); 2005, ISBN 0-393-30734-4(paperback).
James, T.C.G.
The Battle of Britain (Air Defence of Great Britain;
vol. 2). London/New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000.
ISBN 0-7146-5123-0(hardcover); ISBN 0-7146-8149-0
(paperback, ).
James, T.C.G. Growth of
Fighter
Fighter Command, 1936–1940 (Air Defence of
Great Britain; vol. 1). London; New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000.
ISBN 0-7146-5118-4.
James, T.C.G. Night Air Defence During the Blitz. London/New York:
Frank Cass Publishers, 2003. ISBN 0-7146-5166-4.
McGlashan, Kenneth B. with Owen P. Zupp. Down to Earth: A Fighter
Pilot Recounts His Experiences of Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain,
Dieppe, D-Day and Beyond. London: Grub Street Publishing, 2007.
ISBN 1-904943-84-5.
March, Edgar J. British Destroyers; a History of Development
1892–1953. London: Seely Service & Co. Limited, 1966.
Olson, Lynne and Stanley Cloud. A Question of Honor: The Kościuszko
Squadron: Forgotten Heroes of World War II. New York: Knopf, 2003.
ISBN 0-375-41197-6. NB: This book is also published under the
following title:
For Your Freedom and Ours: The Kościuszko Squadron – Forgotten Heroes of World War II.
Prien, Jochen and Peter Rodeike.
Messerschmitt Bf 109
Messerschmitt Bf 109 F, G, and K: An
Illustrated Study. Atglen, Pennsylvania: Schiffer Publishing, 1995.
ISBN 0-88740-424-3.
Ray, John. Battle of Britain. London: The Orion Publishing Co., 2003.
ISBN 1-85409-345-2.
Ray, John Philip. The Battle of Britain: Dowding and the First Victory
1940. London: Cassel & Co., 2001. ISBN 0-304-35677-8.
Ray, John Philip. The Battle of Britain: New Perspectives: Behind the
Scenes of the Great Air War. London: Arms & Armour Press, 1994
(hardcover, ISBN 1-85409-229-4); London: Orion Publishing, 1996
(paperback, ISBN 1-85409-345-2).
Rongers, Eppo H. De oorlog in mei '40, Utrecht/Antwerpen: Uitgeverij
Het Spectrum N.V., 1969, No ISBN
Townsend, Peter. Duel of Eagles (new edition). London: Phoenix, 2000.
ISBN 1-84212-211-8.
Wellum, Geoffrey. First Light: The Story of the Boy Who Became a Man
in the War-Torn Skies Above Britain. New York: Viking Books, 2002.
ISBN 0-670-91248-4 (hardcover); Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons,
2003. ISBN 0-471-42627-X (hardcover); London: Penguin Books,
2003. ISBN 0-14-100814-8 (paperback).
Zaloga, Steven J. and Richard Hook. The Polish Army 1939–45. London:
Osprey, 1982. ISBN 0-85045-417-4.
General
The Battle of Britain Historical Timeline
Day by Day blog charting the progress of the Battle by ex RAF veteran
Battle Of Britain Historical Society
video:
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain on YouTube, (52 min.) complete film
documentary by
Frank Capra
Frank Capra made for U.S. Army
The Battle of Britain "In Photos"
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force history
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Memorial
BBC History Overview of Battle
Historical recording BBC: Churchill's "This Was Their Finest Hour"
speech
Radio
New Zealand
New Zealand 'Sounds Historical' ANZAC Day, 25 April 2008:
Historical recording of Sir
Keith Park
Keith Park describing the Battle of
Britain.(Scroll down to 10:50 am).
Air Chief Marshal
Hugh Dowding
Hugh Dowding on the
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain (despatch to
the Secretary of State, August 1941)
Royal Engineers Museum: Royal Engineers during the Second World War
(airfield repair)
Shoreham Aircraft Museum
Tangmere Military Aviation Museum
Kent
Kent
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Museum
ADLG Visits RAF
Uxbridge
Uxbridge
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain Operations Room
British Invasion Defences
The Falco and
Regia Aeronautica
Regia Aeronautica in the Battle of Britain
History of North Weald Airfield
The Royal Mint Memorial website
New Zealanders in the
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain (NZHistory.net.nz)
New Zealanders in the
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain (official history)
Battle for Britain, short film starring Julian Glover
Interactive map showing
Battle of Britain airfields
Battle of Britain airfields and squadrons by
date
http://garry-campion.com/
Air Defence of Great Britain
Air Defence of Great Britain during the Second World War
Overview
Royal Air Force
Royal Canadian Air Force
Strategic bombing
Night fighter
Big Wing
Big Wing formation
People
RAF
Hugh Dowding Charles Portal Cyril Newall Trafford Leigh-Mallory Keith Park Sholto Douglas
Army
Frederick Pile
Scientists
R. V. Jones Robert Watson-Watt
Organisation
Commands
RAF
Fighter
Fighter Command
RAF Balloon Command
RAF Coastal Command
Anti-Aircraft Command
RAF
Bomber
Bomber Command
Groups
No. 9 Group RAF No. 10 Group RAF No. 11 Group RAF No. 12 Group RAF No. 13 Group RAF No. 14 Group RAF
AA Corps
1 AA Corps 2 AA Corps 3 AA Corps
AA Divisions
1 AA Division 2 AA Division 3 AA Division 4 AA Division 5 AA Division 6 AA Division 7 AA Division 8 AA Division 9 AA Division 10 AA Division 11 AA Division 12 AA Division
Other units
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain airfields
Eagle Squadrons
Royal Observer Corps
Women's Auxiliary Air Force
Campaigns and operations
Battle of Britain The Blitz Baedeker raids Operation Steinbock Operation Crossbow Operation Diver
Aircraft
Beaufighter Defiant Hurricane Meteor Mosquito Spitfire Tempest Typhoon
Technology
Barrage balloon
Battle of the Beams
Radar
Radar (Chain Home)
German V weapons
Related topics
Air Raid Precautions in the United Kingdom
RAF strategic bombing offensive
United States
United States Army Air Forces
v t e
British Empire
British Empire battles of the Second World War
Africa
East Africa Conquest of British Somaliland Capture of Italian Somaliland Recapture of British Somaliland Italian guerrilla war in Ethiopia
North Africa First Battle of El Alamein Second Battle of El Alamein Italian invasion of Egypt Operation Compass Run for Tunis Siege of Giarabub Siege of Tobruk Capture of Tobruk Operation Brevity Operation Skorpion Operation Sonnenblume Occupation of Libya
Southern Africa Battle of Madagascar
West Africa Battle of Dakar Operation Postmaster
Europe
Arctic Battle of the Barents Sea Evacuation of Norway Occupation of Iceland Evacuation of Spitsbergen Faroe Islands Occupation
Balkans
Reinforcement of Greece
Battle of Crete
Battle of Crete ( Rethymno
Thermopylae
Vevi)
Mediterranean Convoy AN 14 Attack on Mers-el-Kébir Battle of Calabria Campobasso Convoy Battle of Cape Bon Battle of Cape Matapan Battle of Cape Passero Battle of Cape Spada Battle of Cape Spartivento Cigno Convoy Duisburg Convoy Espero Convoy Battle of the Ligurian Sea Battle of Skerki Bank Battle of the Strait of Otranto (1940) Battle of Taranto Tarigo Convoy Battle off Zuwarah Operation Abstention Operation Agreement Operation Albumen Operation Excess Operation Grog Raid on Alexandria Raid on Souda Bay Siege of Malta Malta Convoys
Western Europe
Battle of the Heligoland Bight
BEF
Dunkirk
Dunkirk evacuation
Battle of Britain
The Blitz
Dieppe Raid
Channel Dash
Operation Gisela
Operation Steinbock
Operation Diver
Evacuation of Gibraltar
Juno Beach
Gold Beach
Sword Beach
Clearing the Channel Coast
Battle of the Scheldt
Operation Blackcock
Battle of the Reichswald
St Nazaire Raid
Liberation of Belgium
Liberation of the Netherlands
Far East
Hong Kong
Battle of Kowloon and New Territories
Battle of Hong Kong
Battle of Hong Kong Island
Malay Japanese invasion of Malaya Battle of Jitra Defence of Johore
Singapore Fall of Singapore
Burma Japanese conquest of Burma Arakan Campaign 1942–43 Recapture of Burma
India Invasion of India Operation U-Go Battle of Imphal Battle of Kohima
Indian Ocean
Indian Ocean disaster
Indian Ocean retreat
Cocos Islands mutiny
Indian Ocean raid
Battle of Ceylon
Evacuation of British Somaliland
Japanese occupation of the Andaman Islands
Indian Ocean raid
Indian Ocean raid (1944)
Indian Ocean strike
Battle of the Malacca Strait
Bombing of Sumatra
Bombardment of Andaman Islands
Bombardment of Northern Malay
Middle East
Iraq Invasion of Iraq Battle of Fallujah Siege of Habbaniya Battle of Basra Capture of Baghdad
Iran Invasion of Khuzestan Invasion of Central Iran
Syria–Lebanon Invasion of Lebanon Capture of Beirut Invasion of Syria Capture of Damascus
Americas
Atlantic
Battle of the River Plate
Battle of the Gulf of St. Lawrence
Battle of the
Denmark
Denmark Strait
Newfoundland Escort Force
Mid-Ocean Escort Force
Western Local Escort Force
Western Approaches Escort Force
v t e
World War II
Asia and the Pacific
China South-East Asia North and Central Pacific South-West Pacific
Europe
Western Eastern
Mediterranean and Middle East
North Africa East Africa Italy
West Africa Atlantic North America South America
Casualties Military engagements Conferences Commanders
Participants
Allies (leaders)
Australia
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
China
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Ethiopia
France
Free France
Free France (from June 1940)
Greece
India
Italy (from September 1943)
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Philippines (Commonwealth)
Poland
South Africa
Southern Rhodesia
Soviet Union
United Kingdom
United States
Puerto Rico
Yugoslavia
Axis and Axis-aligned (leaders)
Albania Bulgaria Reorganized National Government of the Republic of China Independent State of Croatia Finland Germany Hungary Free India Iraq Italy (until September 1943) Italian Social Republic Japan Manchukuo Philippines (Second Republic) Romania Slovakia Thailand Vichy France
Armed neutrality
Resistance
Albania Austria Belgium Bulgaria Czech lands Denmark Estonia Ethiopia France Germany Greece Hong Kong Italy Japan Jewish Korea Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malaya Netherlands Northeast China Norway Philippines Poland
Anti-communist
Romania Thailand Soviet Union Slovakia Western Ukraine Vietnam Yugoslavia
Monarchists
Timeline
Prelude
Africa Asia Europe
1939
Poland Phoney War Winter War Atlantic Changsha China
1940
Weserübung Netherlands Belgium France
Armistice
Armistice of 22 June 1940
Britain North Africa West Africa British Somaliland North China Baltic States Moldova Indochina Greece Compass
1941
East Africa
Yugoslavia
Shanggao
Greece
Crete
Iraq
Soviet Union
Soviet Union (Barbarossa)
Finland
Lithuania
Syria and Lebanon
Kiev
Iran
Leningrad
Gorky
Moscow
Sevastopol
Pearl Harbor
The outbreak of the Pacific War
Hong Kong Philippines Changsha Malaya Borneo (1941–42)
1942
Burma Changsha Java Sea Coral Sea Gazala Dutch Harbor Attu (occupation) Kiska Zhejiang-Jiangxi Midway Rzhev Blue Stalingrad Singapore Dieppe El Alamein Guadalcanal Torch
1943
Tunisia Kursk Smolensk Gorky Solomon Islands Attu Sicily Cottage Lower Dnieper Italy
Armistice
Armistice of Cassibile
Gilbert and Marshall Islands
Burma
Northern
Burma
Burma and Western Yunnan
Changde
1944
Monte Cassino / Shingle Narva Korsun–Cherkassy Tempest Ichi-Go Overlord Neptune Normandy Mariana and Palau Bagration Western Ukraine Tannenberg Line Warsaw Eastern Romania Belgrade Paris Dragoon Gothic Line Market Garden Estonia Crossbow Pointblank Lapland Hungary Leyte Ardennes
Bodenplatte
Philippines (1944–1945)
Burma
Burma (1944–45)
1945
Vistula–Oder Iwo Jima Western invasion of Germany Okinawa Italy (Spring 1945) Borneo Syrmian Front Berlin Czechoslovakia Budapest West Hunan Guangxi Surrender of Germany Project Hula Manchuria Manila Borneo Taipei Atomic bombings
Debate
Kuril Islands
Shumshu
Surrender of Japan
End of
World War II
World War II in Asia
Aspects
General
Famines
Bengal famine of 1943 Chinese famine of 1942–43 Greek Famine of 1941-1944 Dutch famine of 1944–45 Vietnamese Famine of 1945
Air warfare of World War II Blitzkrieg Comparative military ranks Cryptography Diplomacy Home front
United States Australian United Kingdom
Lend-Lease Manhattan Project Military awards Military equipment Military production Nazi plunder Opposition Technology
Allied cooperation
Total war Strategic bombing Puppet states Women Art and World War II
Aftermath
Expulsion of Germans Operation Paperclip Operation Osoaviakhim Operation Keelhaul Occupation of Germany Territorial changes of Germany Soviet occupations
Romania Poland Hungary Baltic States
Occupation of Japan First Indochina War Indonesian National Revolution Cold War Decolonization Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany Popular culture
War crimes
Allied war crimes
Soviet war crimes
British war crimes
United States
United States war crimes
German (Forced labour) / Wehrmacht war crimes
Holocaust Aftermath Response Prosecution
Italian war crimes Japanese war crimes
Unit 731 Prosecution
Croatian war crimes
against the Serbs against the Jews
Romanian war crimes
Wartime sexual violence
German military brothels Camp brothels Rape during the occupation of Japan Sook Ching Comfort women Rape of Nanking Rape of Manila Rape during the occupation of Germany Rape during the liberation of France Rape during the liberation of Poland
Prisoners
Finnish prisoners of war in the Soviet Union German prisoners of war in the Soviet Union German prisoners of war in the United States Italian prisoners of war in the Soviet Union Japanese prisoners of war in the Soviet Union Japanese prisoners of war in World War II German mistreatment of Soviet prisoners of war Polish prisoners of war in the Soviet Union Romanian prisoners of war in the Soviet Union Soviet prisoners of war in Finland
Bibliography Category Portal
v t e
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force portal
Formations and units
Commands Groups Stations Wings Squadrons Flights Conversion units Operational Training units Schools / Training units Ferry units Glider units Misc units Regiment squadrons
Branches and components
Air Force Board RAF Flying Branch RAF Regiment RAF Chaplains Branch RAF Intelligence RAF Legal Branch RAF Medical Services Princess Mary's RAF Nursing Service RAF Police Search and Rescue Force Mountain Rescue Service RAF Marine Branch RAF Ground Trades
Reserve forces
Royal Auxiliary Air Force RAF Volunteer Reserve
Associated civil organisations
Air Training Corps
Royal Air Forces Association
RAF Centre of Aviation Medicine
RAF Benevolent Fund
RAF Football Association
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force Museum
Equipment
List of RAF aircraft List of RAF missiles
Personnel
Officer ranks Other ranks List of personnel
Appointments
Chief of Air Staff Assistant Chief of the Air Staff Air Member for Personnel Air Secretary Air Member for Materiel Commandant-General of the RAF Regiment Chief of the Air Staff's Warrant Officer
Symbols and uniform
Ensign Badge Roundels Uniform Heraldic badges
History Timeline Future
Portals Access related topics
Military of Germany portal
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force portal
World War II
World War II portal
Find out more on's Sister projects